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“Now I prefer cloudy days when the drones don’t fly. When the sky 
brightens and becomes blue, the drones return and so does the fear. 
Children don’t play so often now, and have stopped going to school. 
Education isn’t possible as long as the drone circles overhead.”1 
Zubair Rehman (13 years old), Congressional Hearing, 29 October 2013 
 
In the past decade, targeted killing, predominantly carried out by drones, has 
become a common tool in the “war on terrorism”. 
 
In 2000, the Israeli government adopted a policy of “targeted killings” 
regarding Palestinians who were suspected of being members of a terrorist 
group within the occupied territories. In accordance with this policy, Israel 
used drones to kill suspected terrorists such as Hussein Abayat2 or Ahmed 
Yassin.3  
 
In November 2002, a car travelling in Yemen was destroyed by an 
unmanned Predator drone controlled by the United States.4 This resulted in 
the killing of Ali Qaed Senyan al-Harithi and five other suspected members of 
al-Qaeda.5 In Pakistan between 2004 and 2014 approximately 400 airborne 
unmanned drone strikes were carried out with the intent to kill suspected 
terrorists.6 The number of similar drone strikes in Yemen in the period 2002 
to 2014 is estimated at between 67 and 79.7 
                                            
1 Karen McVeigh “Drone strikes: Tears in Congress as Pakistani family tell of mother’s 
death”, The Guardian, 29 October 2013, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/29/pakistan-family-drone-victim-testimony-
congress (last accessed: 25 December 2014). 
2 Alan Philips “Israeli rocket kills Fatah militant”, The Telegraph, 10 November 2000, 
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/1373950/Israeli-
rocket-kills-Fatah-militant.html. 
3 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs “IDF strike kills Hamas leader Ahmed Yassin”, 22 March 
2000, available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/terrorism/palestinian/pages/sheikh%20yassin%20kill
ed%20in%20idf%20attack%2022-mar-2004.aspx (last accessed: 25 December 2014).  
4 Jane Mayer “The predator war” The New Yorker, 26 October 2009; Greg Miller “C.I.A. said 
to use outsiders to put bombs on drones”, LA Times, 13 February 2009. 
5 Ibid. 
6 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism “Get the Data: Drone Wars”, available at 
http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs/ (last 




The lawfulness of these attacks on suspected terrorists is considered highly 
controversial under international law.  
 
In this paper, I examine the legitimacy of targeted killing under different areas 
of international law. Owing to the specific characteristics of targeted killing by 
means of drones, this area does not easily fit into the known frameworks of 
international law. Therefore, I discuss targeted killings in terms of: 
• The Law-Enforcement Model 
• The Right of Self-Defense 
• International Humanitarian Law. 
 
In each case I refer to the targeted killings perpetrated by the United States 
in Pakistan and Yemen. The situation in these states differs from that of the 
past decade in Afghanistan, where the United States designated the state as 
a so-called “hot” battlefield.8 Within this examination, I investigate whether 
Pakistan and Yemen indeed constitute a so-called “hot” battlefield.  
 
In order to examine the legitimacy of targeted killing, I define the elements of 
this method of killing as examined in this paper in chapter II. I use the 
definition of the legal advisor to the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), as well as the findings of the United Nations Report on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions.  
 
In Chapter III, the application of the law-enforcement model to the issue of 
targeted killing is scrutinised. I discuss the application of the law-enforcement 
model, which is fundamentally designed for domestic relationships between 
the state and individuals. This model is based mainly on human rights. I 
                                            
8 See Department of Justice White Paper on the Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed 
Against a U.S. Citizen who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al Qa’ida or an Associated 
Force (hereinafter: White Paper), available at 
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf (last 
accessed: 12 January 2015) at 3; see also John Brennan, Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism “Strenghtening our security by adhering to our 
values and laws”, 16 September 2011, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-
an (last accessed: 5 March 2015). The term “hot battlefield” is explained further in Chapter 
III.4. 
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examine whether international human rights law applies to situations of 
targeted killing and, furthermore, whether a state that acts outside its 
territorial borders is bound by international human rights law. In this context, 
the paper focuses on the right to life and examines the universal status of the 
right to life. Thereafter, I illustrate requirements under which targeted killing 
may be lawful in terms of the law-enforcement model.  
 
In Chapter IV, the issue of targeted killing in respect of the right to self-
defense is discussed. In this instance I concentrate on the cases of targeted 
killings perpetrated by the United States in Pakistan and Yemen, where the 
“war on terrorism” was transferred from Afghanistan. This paper puts 
particular emphasis on the geographical limitation of the right of self-defense. 
 
Chapter V subsumes targeted killings of suspected terrorists under the 
armed conflict model, which is designed for times of war. The decisive point 
here is the application of the law of armed conflict. Therefore, the paper 
discusses targeted killings under the model of an international and non-
international armed conflict. Furthermore, this paper illustrates the difficulties 
that result from applying the armed conflict model to such killings.  
 
Chapter VI discusses the need for a new model with regard to the conduct of 
targeted killing. I illustrate the weak points of all models presented and 
propose new models in respect of these type of killing in Chapter VII. I 
present standards that a wholly new model should contain in order to cover 
the issue of targeted killings of suspected terrorists and provide innocent 
civilians with the protection they need. I outline measures required to be 
taken before a practicable result can be found. However, I also point out the 
risks that may result from establishing a new model.  
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II. A Definition of Targeted Killing 
First, I define the term “targeted killing” as it is examined in this paper. There 
is “no settled definition” for the concept of targeted killing.9 However, the legal 
advisor to the ICRC, Nils Melzer, suggests the key elements of such a 
definition.10 These elements have been endorsed by scholarship11 and the 
UN Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions.12 
 
According to Melzer, the definition comprises five cumulative elements.13 The 
first element is the use of lethal force against human beings.14 This element 
also covers innovative means of lethal force such as weapons disguised in 
an umbrella or poisoned letters.15  
 
The second element is the “intent, premeditation and deliberation to kill”.16 
This means that the intent must be to kill the targeted person. 17 
Premeditation requires that the intent must be “based on a conscious 
choice”.18 Moreover, “deliberation” means that the “targeted person must be 
the aim of the operation”.19  
 
Furthermore, according to Melzer, the definition requires an element of 
selection. 20  In this context, the targeted person must be selected 
                                            
9 Jake William Rylatt “An evaluation of the US policy of ‘targeted killing’ under international 
law: The case of Anwar al-Aulaqi (Part 1)” (2013) 44 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 39 at 41.  
10 Nils Melzer Targeted Killing in International Law (2008) 3–9. 
11 See Meagan S. Wong “Targeted killings and the international legal framework: With 
particular reference to the US operation against Osama Bin Laden” (2012) 11 CJIL 127 at 
128; see also Benjamin R. Farley “Targeting Anwar al-Aulaqi: A case study in U.S. drone 
strikes and targeted killing” (2012) 2 Am. Univ. Nat’l Secc. L. Brief 57 at 60; Amos Guiora 
“Targeted killing as active self-defence” (2004) 36 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 319 at 322. 
12  Philip Alston, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions 
“Study on targeted killings” (28 May 2010) Int’l L. Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add. 6, 
para 1. 
13 Melzer (note 10) 3.   
14 Ibid.  
15 Brian Sang YK “Clearing some of the fog of war over combating terrorists on the frontiers 
of international law: Targeted killing and the international humanitarian law” (2011) 1 African 
Yearbook on Int’l. Humanitarian L. 1 at 7.  




20 Ibid; see also David Ennis “Pre-emption, assassination and the war on terrorism” (2005) 
27 Campbell L. Review 253 at 255. 
 9 
individually.21 This element distinguishes targeted killings from “unspecified 
or random targets”.22 
 
The fourth element requires the “lack of physical custody”.23 This requirement 
can be used to distinguish targeted killing from judicial sentences or extra-
judicial executions.24 
 
The fifth element is the “attribution to a subject of international law”.25 In most 
of the cases targeted killings will be attributed to states. 26  However, 
according to Melzer, this does not exclude the possibility that targeted killings 
may also be attributed to non-state actors for very limited purposes and only 
in certain situations.27 Melzer argues that such an attribution can result from 
the premise that “international law regulates, prohibits or penalizes the use of 
force by them”.28  
 
The above-mentioned elements can also be found in the report of the United 
Nations Human Rights Council regarding extrajudicial, summary and 
arbitrary executions, which defined targeted killing as  
 
“the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by 
States or their agents acting under colour of law, or by an organized 
armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual who is not in 
the physical custody of the perpetrator”.29 
 
For the purposes of this paper I also adopt a working definition of terrorism, 
even though the definition of a “terrorist” or “terrorism” is still not settled and 
both terms remain highly controversial. This paper does not intend to enter 
into a discussion about the definition of terrorism and I adopt the definition of 
the UN Security Council Resolution 1566 that defines an act of terrorism as: 
                                            
21 Ennis (note 20) 255. 
22 Ibid. 






29 Alston (note 12) para 1. 
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“[Any] criminal act, including against civilians, committed with the intent 
to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the 
purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of 
persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a 
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from 
doing any act …”30 
 
The prevention and punishment of criminal acts constitutes an essential part 
of the law-enforcement model. Therefore, I examine whether targeted killing 
of suspected terrorists may be subsumed under the law-enforcement model.  
 
III. The Law-Enforcement Model 
The law-enforcement model  
 
“includes the totality of international rules, which balance the collective 
interest in enforcing public security, law and order against the conflicting 
interest in protecting individual rights and liberties”.31  
 
Under the law-enforcement model, a terrorist is considered a “suspect” or a 
“criminal”. Based on that premise, a terrorist should therefore enjoy the same 
rights as a suspect or criminal.  
 
1. Application of the Law-Enforcement Model 
Targeted killing of suspected terrorists constitutes a significant part of the 
“war against terrorism”. When states classify targeted killings as “extrajudicial 
executions”, this “implies that the relevant legal model is the law-enforcement 
model”.32 Supporters of the application of the law-enforcement model argue 
that targeted killings are not part of an armed conflict and therefore do not fall 
                                            
30 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566, 8 October 2004, S/Res/1566, para 3. 
31 Melzer (note 10) 89. 
32 David Kretzmer “Targeted killing of suspected terrorists: Extra-judicial executions or 
legitimate means of defence?” (2005) 16(2) EJIL 171 at 176. 
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under the regime of International Humanitarian Law (IHL).33 Furthermore, it is 
argued that the military status of a suspected terrorist is uncertain under IHL 
and therefore such persons cannot constitute a definite military target under 
the IHL regime.34  
 
Owing to the absence of armed conflict and the uncertainty regarding the 
military status of suspected terrorists, Melzer argues that targeted killings 
cannot be covered by the ius in bello, but have to be subsumed under the 
law-enforcement model. 35  The issues regarding the military status of a 
suspected terrorist and the existence of an armed conflict under IHL are 
examined further below.  
 
However, due to the fact that targeted killings almost always occur outside 
the territory of the targeting state, the question arises of how far the law-
enforcement model can apply outside the territory of that state. The law-
enforcement model is domestically oriented, unless universal jurisdiction was 
to constitute the legal basis.36 Therefore, one may argue that this model 
reaches its limits with the territory or jurisdiction of each state. By way of 
contrast, Melzer argues that territorial jurisdiction is not decisive for the 
application of the law-enforcement model.37 He bases his argument for the 
application on the concept of “conduct and effect”. This concept applies when 
a state is exercising authority or power in a state where targeted killing 
occurs.38 Melzer further states that territorial considerations are decisive for 
the “international lawfulness of a State’s exercise of jurisdiction”, but not for 
the “generic qualification as law enforcement”.39 The qualification as an act of 
law enforcement ought therefore to be construed widely and should to apply 
to any vertical exercise of power or authority by a state over an individual.40  
 
                                            
33 See Melzer (note 10) 224.  
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 See Kretzmer (note 32) 185–186. 
37 Melzer (note 10) 224. 
38 Ibid at 88. 
39 Ibid at 223. 
40 Ibid. 
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Melzer justifies the extension of application beyond the borders of the 
targeting state by arguing that particular international human rights apply 
universally.41 However, he falls short in reasoning why the law-enforcement 
model should apply in the case of targeted killings. He struggles to explain 
why his approach should apply when the targeting state has no effective 
control over the territory in which the targeted killing occurs. He simply 
assumes the application of the model without naming the exact legal basis 
for the vertical exercise of power, namely, targeted killing. According to 
Melzer, it appears to be that because international human rights law applies, 
the law-enforcement model also applies automatically.42 His approach here 
lacks a clear legal basis that legitimates the killing of suspected terrorists by 
drones outside the territory of the targeting state. 
 
Nevertheless, one might argue that the legal basis for legitimacy is founded 
on the protection of universal human rights within the targeting state. This is 
examined further below. Here one may consider the protection of the right to 
life of the population within the targeting state as a basis of legitimacy. 
However, one has to consider that targeted killing – based on such 
assumptions – appears to undermine principles of international law such as 
state sovereignty or the prohibition on use of force under article 2(4) of the 
United Nations (UN) Charter.43 A foundation on which to base the legitimacy 
for targeted killing should therefore be more precise than a mere reference to 
the protection of human rights. If such acts by states violate state sovereignty 
or the prohibition on the use of force, the question arises whether such acts 
may be justified under the right of self-defense (jus ad bellum). I discuss the 
legality of targeted killings under the right of self-defense further below. For 
the sake of argument, I assume that the law-enforcement model applies. 
 
The law-enforcement model is governed by principles that are derived from 
human rights law.44 It sets up very narrow limitations within which the use of 
lethal force may be lawful.45 Every action has usually to be balanced against 
                                            
41 Ibid at 124. 
42 Ibid at 138. 
43 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
44 Melzer (note 10) 89. 
45 Kretzmer (note 32) 180. 
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rights or standards as “the right of every person to life and to due process of 
law”.46  Any conduct that violates these basic principles and takes place 
outside the judicial framework could be considered an unlawful extrajudicial 
execution.47 This analysis of the law-enforcement model concentrates on 
human rights standards and omits the issues concerning state sovereignty.  
 
The application of the paradigm of international human rights law to targeted 
killings raises a number of issues that are examined further below. First, it 
has to be discussed whether international human rights law applies to the 
conduct of a state outside its borders. Secondly, whether situations can exist 
under which targeted killing is permissible. Thirdly, I examine the targeted 
killings of suspected terrorists perpetrated by the United States in Pakistan 
and Yemen under the law-enforcement model. 
 
2. Application of International Human Rights Law to a State’s Actions 
Outside its Territory 
Targeted killings may violate the right to life. The focus of this paper is 
therefore on the right to life within the framework of human rights.  
 
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
states that “every human being has the right to life”.48 Furthermore, article 2 
of the ICCPR determines that a state party is bound to the rights of the 
ICCPR “within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction”.49 The right to life is 
also protected under article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) and article 2(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR).50  
 
The European and the American conventions state that all persons subject to 
the state party’s jurisdiction enjoy the legal protection of human rights.51 
                                            
46 Ibid. 
47 Amnesty International “Israel and the occupied territories: Israel must end its policy of 
assinations”, 4 July 2003, at 1.  
48 Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 23 March 1976. 
49 Article 2 ICCPR. 
50 Article 2(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, 3 May 2002 and article 4 of the 
American Convention of Human Rights, 22 November 1969. 
51 Article 1 ECHR and article 1 ACHR. 
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However, the term “subject to jurisdiction” is not defined in any of the above-
mentioned conventions and is therefore open to interpretation. 
 
In this regard, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held in the 
Bankovic case that the application of the ECHR is limited to the territory of 
the state party exercising its jurisdiction.52 The Court held that the victims of 
the bombing, carried out by the states representing the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) in Kosovo, were not subject to the jurisdiction of those 
same NATO states.53 According to the ECtHR, an exception to the territorial 
limitation can be made only in situations where the state exercises all or 
some governmental powers in the territory of another state with that state’s 
consent, invitation or when it exercises effective control over an occupied 
territory.54  
 
Under the approach of the ECtHR, suspected terrorists who were killed by 
drones were not within the territory of the targeting state and therefore not 
subject to its jurisdiction. In the end, one may conclude that a state would not 
be bound by the provisions of the ICCPR, ECHR or ACHR as long as the 
violation occurs outside its territory and not against one of its own citizens. 
 
By way of contrast, the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), 
in its interpretation of the ICCPR, developed a wider approach than the 
ECtHR, in terms of which any state action will be regarded as subject to that 
state’s jurisdiction. 55  Following this approach, the killing of suspected 
terrorists in a foreign state would be subject to the targeting state’s 
jurisdiction and, therefore, the rights of the ICCPR would also apply to the 
targeted persons. 
 
The issue of jurisdiction concerning the application of human rights is 
therefore controversial. However, assuming that none of the above-
                                            
52 Bankovic v Belgium, ECtHR, Decision as to the Admissibility, 14 November 2000, paras 
61,63 and 65. 
53 Ibid. 
54 See Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections), ECtHR, 23 March 1995, para 62. 
55 UNHRC, General Comment No 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed 
on States Parties to the Covenant, 26 May 2004, para 10. 
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mentioned human rights conventions were to apply, one may raise the 
question whether the right to life for individuals outside the targeting state 
may be derived from another source. Therefore, this paper concentrates on 
the non-conventional character of the right to life. In the next part, I examine 
whether the right to life has become a rule of customary international law or a 
peremptory norm (jus cogens). 
 
Customary international law is essentially the result of state practice which is 
based on a conviction that this practice is required by the law – the so-called 
opinio juris.56  
 
The jus cogens “protects fundamental collective values and interests which 
are of elementary importance for the whole international community and give 
rise to obligations erga omnes”.57 In general, any violation of peremptory 
norm is unlawful and cannot become lawful under any circumstances.58  
According to article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT)  
 
“a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and 
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a 
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified 
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character”.59  
 
This article may be regarded as authoritative for the existence of jus cogens 
rules.60  
 
The UN Human Rights Commission concluded in its comment that an 
arbitrary deprivation of life is an example of the breach of a peremptory 
                                            
56 Melzer (note 10) 180; see also article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute. 
57 International Law Commission “Responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts” 
(2001) Commentary to Draft article 26, para 4, at 208; James Crawford Brownlie’s Principles 
of Public International Law 8ed (2012) 515; Lauri Hannikainen Peremptory Norms (Jus 
Cogens) in International Law (1988) 4. 
58 See Hannikainen (note 57) 6; see also International Law Commission (note 57) 208. 
59 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969. 
60 Hannikainen (note 57) 3. 
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norm.61 Furthermore, the UN Special Rapporteur for the Former Yugoslavia, 
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, concluded in his report that article 6 of the ICCPR has 
become jus cogens. 62  The Inter-American Committee on Human Rights 
(IACtHR) concluded in the Villagran Morales case that the right to life has a 
jus cogens nature and that it is the foundation for the exercise of other 
rights.63 In addition, a large number of scholars support the view that the right 
to life has become a peremptory norm of international law.64  
 
Moreover, the Human Rights Committee concluded that the basic rights of 
human persons  
 
“are erga omnes obligations and that … there is a United Nations Charter 
obligation to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.”65 
 
This also supports the view that the right to life has become a jus cogens rule 
or one of customary international law. 
 
The committee describes the right to life also as a non-derogable right.66 The 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) concluded in the Barcelona Traction case 
that basic human rights give rise to obligations erga omnes.67 The conclusion 
in this case is that erga omnes obligations support the customary character 
of the right to life. 
 
                                            
61 UNHRC, General Comment No. 24, General Comment in issues relating to reservations 
made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or Optional Protocols thereto, or in 
relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant, 4 November 1994, para 10. 
62 Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapperteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 
Report in the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia, 17 
November 1992, para 129. 
63 Villagram Morales v Guatemala, IACtHR Judgment of 19 November 1999 para 139. 
64 See Yoram Dinstein “The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty” in L. Henkin (ed) 
The International Bill of Rights – the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1981) 114,115; 
see also Paul Gormley “The right to life and the rule of non-derogability: Peremptory norms 
of jus cogens” in Ramcharan (ed.) The Right to Life in International Law (1985) 120; see 
also Nigel Rodley The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law (1999) 178–179.  
65 UNHRC (note 55) para 2. 
66 UNHRC, General Comment No 29, Derogations during a State of Emergency, 31 August 
2001, para 7.   
67 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, ICJ 
Judgment, 5 February 1970 (hereinafter: Barcelona Traction case) para 34. 
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The decisions by several human rights courts and committees set out above 
– as well as the prevailing academic position – support the view that the right 
to life has become a peremptory norm. Even if one may argue that the right 
to life has not become a peremptory norm, it is difficult to deny that the right 
to life is not protected from arbitrary deprivation under customary 
international law. The protection of the right to life under major human rights 
treaties such as the ICCPR, ECHR or ACHR and the high number of state 
parties make the denial of a customary nature of that right very questionable. 
The customary nature of the right to life is also confirmed by number of 
scholars.68 For the purpose of this paper I accept that the right to life is a rule 
of customary international law and ius cogens. Therefore, this right is not 
suspended by the fact that targeted killing occurs outside the territory of the 
acting state. As a peremptory norm or a rule of customary international law, 
any violation of the right to life may be unlawful. This raises the question 
whether the targeted killings perpetrated by the United States in Pakistan 
and Yemen may violate a jus cogens rule or customary international law, 
which would be unlawful. Therefore, I examine whether targeted killing is a 
violation of the right to life in the next part. 
 
3. Permissibility of Targeted Killing under the Law-Enforcement Model 
First, the suspected terrorists are not the only individuals who may benefit 
from the status of the right to life as a peremptory norm or as customary 
international law. In scrutinising these situations, one has to consider that the 
peremptory or customary international law character of the right to life also 
protects the right to life of individuals in the targeting state. This “duty to 
protect” against potential terrorist attacks may be used by states such as the 
United States as a basis for justifying their actions in Pakistan or Yemen. In 
this regard, there may be exceptional circumstances which may not lead to 
an unlawful violation of the right to life. Exceptional circumstances are 
described by the ECHR as “absolute necessity” and by the ICCPR as “non-
arbitrary”.   
 
                                            
68 See Kretzmer (note 32) 185; see also Yoram Dinstein “The right to life, physical integrity, 
and liberty” in L. Henkin (ed.) The International Bill of Rights – the Covenant on Political and 
Civil Rights (1981) 114, 115; Gormley (note 64) 120; Rodley (note 64) 178–179.  
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In article 2(2) the ECHR requires an “absolute necessity” test in order to 
determine when the use of lethal force will not violate the right to life under 
article 2(1).69 In this context, article 2(2) sets up a catalogue for when the use 
of lethal force may be absolutely necessary: 
 
“(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect 
a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) 
in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.”70 
 
The ECtHR has not yet had the chance to address the issue of targeted 
killings. However, the Court set out that the test of necessity must be strict 
one.71 In determining whether the use of lethal force was necessary, one has 
to raise the questions whether the use of lethal force is an absolute 
requirement, or whether milder measures are available in order to protect the 
threatened persons.72 
 
By way of contrast, article 6(1) of the ICCPR states that “no one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life”.73 The ACHR or the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) also use the expression “arbitrarily”.74  
 
The ICCPR does not contain any definition of “arbitrary” under article 6.75 
The main purpose behind not defining “arbitrary” was to avoid any 
endorsement to kill.76 However, the material scope of arbitrariness may be 
determined by review of the decisions by the human rights committees, 
commissions and courts to the ICCPR, ACHR and ECHR. Nevertheless, the 
commissions and committees also have difficulties in determining the scope 
of “arbitrary” against the backdrop of targeted killing or in scrutinising the 
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lawfulness of targeted killings under the model of international human rights 
law.77 
 
In its report concerning the targeted killing of Palestinians in Israel the 
UNHRC stated that: 
 
“The Committee is concerned by what the State party calls ‘targeted 
killings’ of those identified by the State party as suspected terrorists in 
the Occupied Territories. This practice would appear to be used at least 
in part as a deterrent or punishment, thus raising issues under article 6. 
While noting the delegation’s observations about respect for the principle 
of proportionality in any response to terrorist activities against civilians 
and its affirmation that only persons taking direct part in hostilities have 
been targeted, the Committee remains concerned about the nature and 
extent of the responses of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) to Palestinian 
terrorist attacks.  
 
The State party should ensure that the utmost consideration is given to 
the principle of proportionality in all its responses to terrorist threats and 
activities. State policy in this respect should be spelled out clearly in 
guidelines to regional military commanders, and complaints about 
disproportionate use of force should be investigated promptly by an 
independent body. Before resorting to the use of deadly force, all 
measures to arrest a person suspected of being in the process of 
committing acts of terror must be exhausted.”78 
 
This extract does not clear the fog regarding the arbitrariness of targeted 
killing. It merely concludes that the deterrent and punishment effect of 
targeted killing raises an issue under article 6 of the ICCPR. Furthermore, it 
omits the issue of how far these types of killing as pre-emptive measures 
                                            
77 See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Report on Terrorism and Human 
Rights, 22 October 2002, available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Terrorism/Eng/exe.htm; see 
also Alejandre et al v Cuba, IACiHR, 29 September 1999; McCann v UK, ECHR, 27 
September 1995. 
78 UNHRC Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee on Report of Israel, 21 
August 2003, CCPR/CO/78/ISR, para 15. 
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violate this same article. 79  Nevertheless, the report concludes that all 
measures to arrest must be exhausted before deadly force is employed.80 
One may infer from that wording that the committee allowed for the use of 
deadly force in the case of an imminent attack.81  
 
The Report on Terrorism and Human Rights by the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACiHR) also illustrates the difficulties in the 
material scope of “arbitrary” under article 6 of the ICCPR. The commission 
concluded: 
 
“The state may resort to force only against individuals that threaten the 
security of all, and therefore the state may not use force against civilians 
who do not present such a threat. The state must distinguish between 
the civilians and those individuals who constitute the threat.”82 
 
According to this statement, there must be a threat to the security of all. 
However, the report is confusing when it bases its argumentation on the 
status of a person as civilian or a person who constitutes a threat. This status 
is relevant only under the regime of IHL, where the principle of distinction 
exists.83 Under the law-enforcement model, the status of an individual is 
irrelevant.84 
 
However, the practice by the UNHRC, the IACiHR and IACtHR suggest four 
criteria/situations for when the deprivation of life may be regarded as 
arbitrary.  
 
First, the deprivation of life is arbitrary when no sufficient legal basis for it 
exists.85 That legal basis or law is not sufficient if it “does not strictly control 
and limit the circumstances in which a person may be deprived of his life by 
                                            
79 Kretzmer (note 32) 180. 
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81 See Ibid. 
82 Report on Terrorism and Human Rights (note 77) para 90. 
83 Kretzmer (note 32) 181. 
84 Ibid. 
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the authorities of a State”.86 In this context, the lack of a sufficient legal basis 
by the domestic law contrary to internationally binding standards may in itself 
amount to a violation of the right to life.87 An effective protection of the right to 
life cannot be guaranteed by the existence of extra-legal killings.88 
 
Secondly, if the use of lethal force was not absolutely necessary or 
unavoidable to maintain law and order or to protect collective security, a 
deprivation of life is arbitrary.89 Any use of lethal force that exceeds the 
minimum necessary to achieve the legitimate purpose, also constitutes an 
arbitrary deprivation of life.90 Furthermore, any deprivation of life of a person 
who does not pose a threat at the time of the deprivation must be regarded 
as arbitrary.91 
 
Thirdly, a deprivation of life is arbitrary when the use of lethal force is 
disproportionate. 92  This standard requires proportionality between the 
“deprivation of life” and the actual danger.93 In this instance, a merely political 
motive would not constitute an actual danger and therefore its “removal” may 
be regarded as arbitrary.94  
 
Fourthly, a deprivation of life is arbitrary if it does not meet the standard of 
precaution.”95 A “deprivation of life” may be considered as arbitrary when 
precautionary measures could have been taken, but were not considered.96 
These measures can be warnings given or the opportunity to surrender 
                                            
86 Ibid. 
87 Suarez de Guerrero v Columbia, UNHRC, 31 March 1982, paras 13.1–13.3. 
88 Ibid. 
89Alejandre et al. v Cuba, IACiHR, 29 September 1999, paras 37, 42; Report on Terrorism 
and Human Rights (note 77) paras 87, 88. 
90 Ibid; see also Suarez de Guerrero v Columbia (note 87) para 13.1. 
91 Alejandre et al. v Cuba, IACiHR, 29 September 1999, para 42; IACiHR “Report on 
terrorism and human rights” (note 77) para 90. 
92 See Report on Terrorism and Human Rights (note 77) para 87; see also Melzer (note 10) 
101. 
93 Melzer (note 10) 101. 
94 Alejandre et al v Cuba, IACiHR 29 September 1999, paras 37, 42; Suarez de Guerrero v 
Columbia (note 87) para 13.1; Report on Terrorism and Human Rights (note 77) paras 87, 
88. 
95 Melzer (note 10) 101. 
96 Ibid. 
 22 
offered.97 Furthermore, mere suspicion cannot justify a suspension of due 
process principles where the deprivation of life is concerned.98 
 
However, even though one can refer to the standards of identifying an 
arbitrary deprivation of life, the question arises in how far these standards 
may be applicable under a situation of targeted killing in practice. In what 
follows, I focus on standards of necessity and proportionality with regard to 
the goals of the law-enforcement model. 
 
The law-enforcement model is designed to prevent and to deter criminal 
acts.99 The prevention of criminal acts, however, cannot be achieved by 
simply eliminating every potential perpetrator. 100  Under this model, 
prevention is meant to be reached by subjecting criminal acts to a criminal 
process.101 The threat of legal sanctions and the enforcement of criminal law 
against those who break the law fulfil the purpose of deterrence.102 The main 
issue of concern here is that targeted killing takes place outside the 
jurisdiction of the targeting state. In these circumstances it is not possible for 
the state to take preventive measures, which are primarily developed for its 
own domestic use. Assuming that the host state is unable or unwilling to 
conduct measures of law enforcement, one may question whether such 
circumstance might justify a suspension of due process rights by the 
targeting state. In practice, the United States has shown that it is eager to 
suspend due process rights – as set out in the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution – in the case of targeted killings.103 According to the Department 
of Justice’s White Paper, due process rights of a US citizen may be 
suspended in a case of absolute necessity.104  
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The White Paper states that the standard of “absolute necessity” is met if 
there is an imminent threat and no milder means could achieve the desired 
result. 105  In essence, such an approach corresponds with the idea of 
necessity under the law-enforcement model that the threat of violence must 
be so imminent that attempting to arrest the perpetrator would still allow him 
or her to carry out the threat.106 Therefore, the use of force can be regarded 
as necessary only when there is “no feasible possibility of protecting the 
prospective victim by apprehending the suspected perpetrator”.107 However, 
according to the White Paper, the imminent threat “does not require the 
United States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on US persons 
and interests will take place in the immediate future”.108 This approach does 
not follow a logical interpretation, nor is it in line with the illustrated 
interpretation by international human rights committees or commissions. An 
imminent threat that does not have to be immediate appears to be a simple 
contradiction. This case illustrates the difficulties of applying the necessity 
test. Owing to the high burden of proof, states may try to weaken the 
requirement of an imminent threat simply by adopting a illogical definition of 
immediacy.   
 
Aside from this extraordinary application of “imminent threat” under the White 
Paper, the question still persists whether a situation in which the host state is 
unable or unwilling to arrest the suspected terrorist could constitute a case of 
absolute necessity and thereby justify the use of lethal force.109 In addition, 
one has to question whether it would fulfil the requirement of necessity if 
there is strong evidence of a future terrorist attack in the victim state. In this 
regard, it is noticeable that even in the case of an apparent threat to civilians, 
such a case would not automatically justify the use of lethal force in order to 
kill that person and remove the threat.110 According to the White Paper, 
                                            
105 Ibid. 
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however, the mere fact that a state that is unwilling or unable to arrest the 
suspected terrorist justifies the use of lethal force in a foreign state.111  
 
Furthermore, the requirement of proportionality is difficult to fulfil under a 
situation of targeted killing. Targeted killing may not be permissible when the 
expected harm is disproportionate to the gravity of threat or offence that it 
aims to remove.112 Notably, even the intention to arrest may not justify the 
use of lethal force and risk the life of the suspected person.113 Targeted 
killing may never become the “end” in itself under the law-enforcement model, 
but must rather constitute the means to achieve a different, legitimate 
purpose.114 By way of contrast, such circumstances may justify the use of 
force in a situation of armed conflict.115 
 
The above-mentioned situations and requirements of absolute necessity and 
proportionality remain vague and it is not clear to what extent there can be a 
lawful case of targeted killing from the perspective of the right to life. One 
may argue, however, that in a case where the threat of violence might not be 
imminent, but the use of lethal force would constitute the last possibility to 
prevent the terrorist attack, targeted killing may not constitute an arbitrary 
deprivation of life.116 
 
However, one should bear in mind that the inability to apprehend the 
suspected terrorist cannot automatically result in a licence to kill.117 Such an 
assumption would simply violate the rights of an individual as a suspect. 
Furthermore, the existence of a situation where lethal force constitutes the 
only possible way of preventing a terrorist attack leaves a large space for 
interpretation. This again may be exploited by the targeting state in justifying 
its acts and calls concurrently for an independent institution to review each 
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case. The necessity and proportionality test has therefore to be strict in order 
to comply with the protection of the right to life. 
 
In the end, under the law-enforcement model, the right to life is protected by 
customary international law. This essential human right may be limited only if 
such a deprivation of life is not arbitrary and fulfils the requirements of legal 
basis, necessity, proportionality and precaution; all these requirements 
having to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Against the backdrop of 
customary international law, I wish to emphasise that any violation of this rule 
not fulfiling the before-mentioned requirements, is unlawful. 
 
 
4. Targeted Killings Perpetrated by the United States in Pakistan and 
Yemen 
The situation in Pakistan and Yemen differs from “ordinary” battlefields such 
as Afghanistan or Iraq.118 The programme of targeted killings perpetrated by 
the United States in Pakistan and Yemen illustrates that the targeting state 
does not even consider the law-enforcement model.119 In this situation, the 
White Paper is extremely important as it describes the legal framework under 
which it may be lawful to kill a US citizen by means of a drone in a foreign 
state.120 In the reverse situation, one may assume that the United States will 
not set the threshold any higher in the case of lethal force against non-
citizens. The White Paper considers the ius ad bellum and the ius in bello as 
a legal basis for any use of lethal force.121 Therefore, the question that has to 
be answered is whether the law-enforcement model applies to the targeted 
killings by the United States in Pakistan and Yemen. 
 
First, the identification of a terrorist as a criminal supports the view that the 
law-enforcement model has to apply.122 In terms of this model, a terrorist is a 
criminal.123 This conclusion also complies with current definitions or various 
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drafts concerning the term “terrorism”. 124  Moreover, these definitions of 
terrorism share the lowest common  factor of describing terrorism as a 
“criminal act”.125 This categorisation of a criminal act supports the view that 
the law-enforcement model is eminently suited to the programme of targeted 
killing of suspected terrorists.  
 
Secondly, the situation in Yemen and Pakistan differs from that in 
Afghanistan. The difference is that the United Sates classifies Afghanistan as 
a so-called “hot” battlefield where IHL rules apply.126 
 
John Brennan stated in his address on “Strengthening our Security by 
Adhering to our Values and Laws” that the United States is at “war” with al-
Qaeda which also operates in states such as Yemen and Pakistan.127 In 
defining the geographical scope of that “war”, Brennan concludes that the 
authority to use force is not solely restricted to “hot” battlefields such as 
Afghanistan.128 The White Paper uses Brennan’s remark as the authority for 
extending the geographical scope of the use of force to zones outside active 
hostilities.129 These two sources illustrate that Afghanistan constitutes a “hot” 
battlefield and that states such as Yemen and Pakistan illustrate quite 
another situation, which does not qualify as a “hot” battlefield.  
The term “hot” battlefield is not defined under IHL. 130  Daskal sets out 
characteristics of that term, which are close to the definition of the “zone of 
military operations” under the Geneva Conventions.131 Under the Geneva 
Conventions, the term “zone of military operations” requires actual or 
planned troop movement.132 The constitution of a “zone of military operations” 
does not require the occurrence of actual fighting under the conventions.133 
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The US Supreme Court concluded that the presence of a large number of 
troops supported the finding that Afghanistan constituted a zone of “active 
combat”.134  
 
However, planned or actual troop movement by the United States does not 
characterise the situation in states such as Pakistan and Yemen. Therefore, 
neither of these states constitute a “hot” battlefield under the characteristics 
described by Daskal. Moreover, that conclusion complies with the statement 
by Brennan and the White Paper that the situation in Pakistan and Yemen is 
outside a “hot” battlefield. 
  
Lubell argues that there is no situation of armed conflict in Yemen and 
Pakistan.135 Owing to the fact that an armed conflict does not exist beyond 
any doubt in these states, and they do not constitute a so-called “hot” 
battlefield, international human rights law has to apply. This law is designed 
primarily to apply outside the times of war. The fact that there is no time of 
war in these territories bars the application of IHL as lex specialis in such 
cases. 136  Therefore, due to the lack of lex specialis of IHL, the law-
enforcement model has to apply in situations such as Pakistan and Yemen.  
 
As mentioned above, well-founded arguments an the application of the law-
enforcement model exist. Such an assumption affects the status of 
suspected terrorists and restrictions for the targeting state significantly. 
 
The law-enforcement regime does not endanger the life of those innocent 
civilians who are not even consciously living in a so-called “hot” battlefield 
zone. As is discussed further below, the armed conflict model does put the 
lives of innocent civilians outside the area of hostilities in jeopardy by 
extending the scope of the armed conflict model.  
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I will now examine whether the programme of targeted killings carried out by 
the United States in Yemen and Pakistan is permissible under the law-
enforcement model. 
 
In determining whether the programme is lawful, we have to consider five 
points. First, there must be a sufficient legal basis for the targeted killing of 
suspected terrorists in Pakistan and Yemen. 137  A sufficient legal basis 
requires a domestic law that strictly controls and limits the use of lethal 
force.138 However, there is no US domestic law that sets up the framework of 
targeted killings in foreign states by the United States. Therefore, there is no 
satisfactory legal basis for targeted killings of suspected terrorists by the 
United States in states like Pakistan and Yemen.  
 
Secondly, assuming that there was a sufficient legal basis for the sake of this 
examination, the law-enforcement model requires an absolute necessity to 
maintain law and order.139 The necessity test requires that the use of lethal 
force must be “strictly unavoidable”.140 This means that if there are other 
means, which would have the same outcome, the use of lethal force does not 
meet the requirement of necessity.141 In addition, an imminent threat and 
strong evidence of a terrorist attack must exist.142 Furthermore, damage and 
injuries to human life have to be minimised by the targeting state.143  
 
Whether the attacks in Pakistan and Yemen were “strictly unavoidable” has 
to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, which goes beyond the purpose of 
this paper. Considering the loss of civilian life,144 one may question whether 
the United States was really serious in its efforts to minimise the threat. The 
assessment of the threat, however, constitutes an area beyond the scope of 
this paper. Owing to the lack of non-classified evidence regarding an 
imminent threat, one may argue that the necessity requirement under the 
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law-enforcement model is not met in the case of the targeted killings in 
Pakistan and Yemen.  
 
Thirdly, the drone attacks must be proportionate. This requires proportionality 
between the “deprivation of life” and the actual danger.145 The danger of 
suspected terrorists in Pakistan and Yemen may only be judged on a case-
by-case basis.  
 
The number of total deaths caused by targeted killing in Pakistan is 
estimated at between 2 442 and 3 942.146 At the same time, the number of 
civilians killed is estimated at between 421 and 960.147 That means that 17% 
to 24% of the individuals who were killed were civilians. The percentage of 
civilians killed by drone attacks in Yemen amounts to 15%. 148  These 
statistics illustrate that there is significant damage to civilians in these states 
and a serious threat to the right to life. In this context, it is questionable in 
how far an actual danger exists. The extent of civilian casualties indicates 
that the actual threat must be of a very high intensity to justify the loss of 
civilian life. One may argue that such conduct might be justified under the 
concept of anticipatory self-defense. However, I want to emphasise that this 
concept sets up very strict limitations, which will be examined further 
below.149 Owing to the high number of civilian casualties and the unspecified 
danger, I regard the programme of targeted killings carried by the United 
States in Pakistan and Yemen as disproportionate. 
 
Fourthly, targeted killing of suspected terrorists in Pakistan and Yemen has 
to fulfil the requirement of precaution. Precaution requires that the security 
set-up, or the operation as such, has to be planned, organised and controlled 
so as to minimise the resort to lethal force to the greatest extent possible.150 
Any determination regarding the target must be subject to constant 
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scrutiny. 151  Owing to the requirements of precaution, which are wholly 
dependent on each case, the fulfilment of that requirement can be decided 
only on a case-by-case basis.  
 
In summary, then, the application of the law-enforcement model to cases in 
Pakistan and Yemen shows that there is definitely no clear domestic legal 
basis for the conduct of targeted killing. Furthermore, the scrutiny of 
necessity and proportionality has shown that it is highly questionable whether 
these requirements are met in the case of these states. Therefore, I assume 
that the targeted killing programme by the United States in Pakistan and 
Yemen is unlawful under the law-enforcement model.  
 
Based on this assumption, the question arises, whether such a conduct 
constitutes a violation of the prohibition on the use of force under article 2(4) 
of the UN Charter. Furthermore, the question arises, whether such a use of 
force can be justified. Leaving aside the possibility of a justification by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, I examine the legality 
of targeted killing under the right of self-defense below. 
 
 
IV. Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists under the Right of Self 
Defense 
Should targeted killing not fall under the law-enforcement model, or be 
unlawful under such a model, one may consider whether it may be legal 
under article 51 of the UN Charter, the right of self-defense. Again, I focus 
my examination on the targeted killings perpetrated by the United States in 
Pakistan and Yemen. Furthermore, I concentrate on controversial issues, 
which are the possibility of an armed attack by a non-state actor, anticipatory 
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Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states that:  
 
“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.”152 
 
The targeted killings perpetrated by the United States in Yemen and Pakistan 
indisputably do constitute a use of force within the meaning of article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter. In the case of Yemen, its president declared his consent to 
US drone strikes on Yemeni territory. 153  Nevertheless, it remains 
questionable in how far that consent has an impact on the killings that were 
conducted before that consent was given. This official consent dates from 
2012, whereby targeted killing has been conducted since 2002. In the case 
of Pakistan there appears to be no consent to the conduct of targeted 
killing.154 
 
Assuming that there is no consent from a state regarding the use of force by 
a foreign state on its territory, that force may be justified under article 51 of 
the UN Charter, namely, the right of self-defense. Here the White Paper155 is 
once again relevant. One aspect of the US justification for the use of lethal 
force against its own citizen in another state is the right of self-defense.156  
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1.#Armed#Attack#under#Article#51#of#the#UN#Charter#
Article 51 requires that an “armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations”157 before the right to self-defense can be claimed. 
 
According to the Nicaragua and Oil Platforms case only “most grave” forms 
of the use of force may qualify as an armed attack which would allow the use 
of force in self-defense.158 Here also, the quality and quantity of the attack 
must be examined.159 Moreover, the ICJ concluded in the Oil Platforms case 
that, in determining the requirement of an armed attack, one has to consider 
the attackers’ intention, the amount of force used and the gravity of resulting 
harm.160 
 
One may argue that the 9/11 attack itself constitutes the severe gravity 
required by article 51 of the UN Charter. Alternatively, one may argue the 
“cumulative approach” 161  after which attacks by al-Qaeda before 11 
September 2001 would constitute an armed attack under article 51. At this 
point, one may also discuss whether the high number of attacks by al-Qaeda 
constituted a threat that might justify the use of anticipatory or pre-emptive 
self-defense in Pakistan and Yemen. This is also examined in further detail 
below. For the purpose of this paper, I assume that the attack of 9/11 itself 
constitutes an armed attack under article 51 of the UN Charter. Therefore, 
the requirement of an “armed attack” is fulfilled in the case of al-Qaeda 
operating from Afghanistan on 11 September 2001. 
 
2. Armed Attack by a Non-State Actor 
The wording of article 51 of the UN Charter does not require that the armed 
attack must come from a state.162 However, the ICJ held in the Wall case that 
the right of self-defense under article 51 requires the attribution of a terrorist 
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attack to a state.163 The ICJ confirmed that conclusion in the DRC v Uganda 
case.164  
 
By way of contrast, there has also been some support for the view that an 
armed attack might come from a non-state actor.165 In this case, Dinstein 
argues that the attacks on the United States of 9/11 rather confirmed the UN 
Charter, due to the fact that the right of self-defense against a non-state actor 
already existed prior to the attack and refers to the 1986 Operation El Dorado 
Canyon, when the United States launched air strikes against Libya. 166 
Furthermore, the separate opinions by Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal 
JJ in the Wall case argue that in terms of the wording of article 51 and 
following the attitude of the Security Council towards the “9/11” terrorist 
attacks, the article does not limit the armed attack as arising from a state.167  
 
According to the ICJ judgments in the Wall case, DRC v Uganda and 
Nicaragua case, the attacks by al-Qaeda cannot constitute an armed attack 
under article 51 of the UN Charter. Following this approach, one has to 
consider whether the al-Qaeda attacks could be attributed to Afghanistan. 
This again, would raise the issue of state attribution, which is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  
 
By way of contrast, according to the separate opinions168 in the Wall case 
and the wording of article 51, the attacks by al-Qaeda constitute an armed 
attack under this article. This is a highly controversial aspect of the right of 
self-defense. However, in order to continue with the current examination I 
assume that the armed attack may come from a non-state actor and 
therefore justifies an act of self-defense, notwithstanding that it is 
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questionable as to whether an armed attack may come from a non-state 
actor. 
 
Based on these assumptions, the United States had the right to carry out an 
act of self-defense against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. It is still questionable 




3. Conditions and Scope of the Right of Self-Defense 
The main conditions for an act of self-defense can be derived from the 
Caroline case.169 An act of self-defense has to meet the requirements of 
immediacy, necessity and proportionality.  
 
a. Immediacy 
According to the Caroline case, the pending attack has to be “instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation”.170  
 
In the case of an ongoing attack, where the victim state defends itself 
immediately, this criterion is irrelevant. 171  However, targeted killings 
perpetrated by the United States in Yemen in Pakistan and Yemen constitute 
a different situation. The armed attack, which triggered the right of self-
defense, occurred in 2001 and was directed from the territory of Afghanistan. 
The United States has continued to conduct targeted killings until today. 
Therefore, it is questionable whether an armed attack carried out in 2001, 
may still justify an act of self-defense in 2014. Schmitt concludes that, if the 
act of self-defense occurs too long after an armed attack, such conduct is 
                                            
169 29 British and Foreign State Papers “Caroline case” (1837) at 1137. 
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171 Michael Schmitt “Targeted killing and international law: Law enforcement, self defence, 
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unlawful.172 As a result, he considers such an act to be retaliatory and not 
defensive.173  
 
Following the approach by Schmitt, the fact that the United States continues 
to conduct targeted killings ten years after the armed attack took place, 
constitutes a retaliatory act that is unlawful and may therefore not meet the 
requirement of immediacy.  
 
However, the targeted killing carried out by the United States may meet the 
requirement of immediacy from the perspective of anticipatory or pre-emptive 
right of self-defense. These constructions do not require an occurred armed 
attack in order to use force under the right of self-defense. Anticipatory self-
defense requires a threat that is instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of 
means, and no moment for deliberation.174 The concept of pre-emptive self-
defense goes even further and allows the use of force in a situation without 
any instant and overwhelming threat.175  
 
A number of targeted killings of suspected terrorists occur under a situation 
without an armed attack and without meeting the criteria of instant and 
overwhelming threat. 176  Under the expansive right of pre-emptive or 
anticipatory self-defense, targeted killings carried out by the United States in 
Pakistan and Yemen may meet the requirement of immediacy.  
 
Under the construction of anticipatory self-defense, it is still questionable 
whether an attack is likely to occur. Schmitt argues that this requirement 
would be met when there is a reasonable belief that a terrorist attack will 
occur.177 It is not certain whether a reasonable belief of an attack can be 
constituted in the case of al-Qaeda bases in Pakistan and Yemen. Based on 
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this assumption, the situation in these territories by no means constitutes a 
threat that is instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for deliberation and does not fulfil the requirement of immediacy. 
 
However, the programme of targeted killings carried out by the United States 
may fulfil the requirement of immediacy under the construction of pre-
emptive self-defense. I wish to emphasise, however, that the existence of 
such an extensive right of self-defense is highly controversial.178 Apart from 
the “Bush Doctrine”, which argues in favour of pre-emptive self-defense, 
scant support for this has been found in state practice and academic 
literature.179  In contrast, the concept of anticipatory self-defense is less 
controversial and more accepted, due to its requirement of an pending attack 
that has to be “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for deliberation”, which goes back to the Caroline case.180 In this 
context, Schmitt states that  
 
“self-defense is permissible only in the last window of opportunity a state 
has to effectively defend itself against an attack that is highly likely to 
occur.”181  
 
The White Paper also requires an “imminent threat of violent attack against 
the United States” in order to use lethal force in a foreign state.182 However, 
the definition of “imminent” in this context is set out in the White Paper as 
follows:  
 
“… the condition that an operational leader presents an “imminent” threat 
of violent attack against the United States does not require the United 
States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on US persons and 
interests will take place in the immediate future.”183 
 
                                            
178 Noam Lubell Extraterritorial Use of Force against Non-State Actors (2011) 55. 
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That definition appears to be too wide and not to comply with a logical 
interpretation of “imminent”. Against the backdrop that the right of self-
defense is an exceptional situation, which may harm individuals who are not 
involved in the conflict, such a definition does not comply with idea of self-
defense. Furthermore, such an interpretation is not congruent with the 
approach of academic scholars.184 
 
If we accept the assumption that there is no need for an instant and 
overwhelming situation in order to meet the requirement of immediacy, 
targeted killings may fulfil this requirement. However, the academic critique 
and state practice on pre-emptive self-defense suggest that this construction 
is highly artificial. It appears that this construction was developed particularly 
to justify use of force under an extraordinary situation. It may result in a 
misuse of the requirement of immediacy and could change the ordinary 
character of the right of self-defense. 
 
In the end, targeted killings of suspected terrorists depend on the scrutiny of 
“reasonable belief” of a threat by the US forces. Such a scrutiny bears the 
risk that a “reasonable belief” of a threat may be accepted more easily in 
order to justify the requirement of immediacy. Eventually, the requirement of 
immediacy has to be examined on a case-by-case basis of each targeted kill. 
However, I wish to emphasise that only under the concept of anticipatory 
self-defense may targeted killings be lawful. The concept of pre-emptive self-
defense bears the risk of misuse, due to its very wide interpretation of 
immediacy and is therefore not in conformity with the nature of the right self-
defense, which results in its unlawfulness.  
 
b. Necessity 
Any act in self-defense has to meet the requirement of necessity. According 
to the Oil Platforms case, the act of self-defense must be necessary to 
prevent a further armed attack or to remove the threat of an armed attack.185 
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In cases of targeted killing carried out by the United States against al-Qaeda 
in Pakistan and Yemen  
 
“self-defense against a non-State actor is necessary only if the attack 
cannot be repelled or averted by the State from whose territory the non-
State group operates”.186  
 
The state conducting targeted killing in a foreign state must therefore prove 
that the territorial state is unable or unwilling to prevent any operations of the 
non-state actor. 187  This test can also be found in the White Paper. 188 
According to Lubell, the necessity test requires that each host state must be 
unwilling or unable to put an end to the armed attack.189 Furthermore, the 
necessity test must be assessed in the context of a threat of a potential 
armed attack in the future, which leads to the debate on anticipatory or pre-
emptive self-defense.190 Lubell concludes that a necessity, based on pre-
emptive self-defense, is possibly unlawful.191 
 
In Yemen, it is unclear whether the government gave its consent for targeted 
killings within its territory before 2012.192 If no consent was given by the 
Yemeni government, targeted killing of suspected terrorists by the United 
States does not meet the requirement of necessity and is therefore unlawful.  
 
The situation in Pakistan is also unclear. There is some evidence that the 
Pakistani government received classified briefings on drone strikes from 
2007 until 2011.193 It is also not clear whether there was tacit consent or 
even any consent whatsoever.194 The spokesman for Pakistan’s Foreign 
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Ministry stated: “We regard such strikes as a violation of our sovereignty as 
well as international law.”195 
 
Even had consent been given for drone strikes between 2007 and 2011, it is 
questionable whether such consent can be used for the period prior to 2007. 
According to the current government, such consent seems to be non-existent 
after 2011.196 Moreover, there is no evidence that either Pakistan or Yemen 
is unwilling or unable to remove the threat, which argues against the 
fulfilment of the necessity requirement. The situation in Pakistan and Yemen 
has to be decided on a case-by-case basis, which is beyond the scope of this 
paper. I emphasise, however, that even if there is or was consent, it is highly 




Another requirement of the act of self-defense is proportionality, in terms of 
which any measures taken to avert a threat must be proportionate. Kress 
calls for a more stringent standard of proportionality due to the fact that self-
defense is conducted against a non-state actor.197 Schmitt argues that in the 
case of terrorism, striking an entire terrorist cell may be justified – even if not 
mandated – to remove the imminent attack in question.198 Lubell argues that 
there can be a territorial limitation to the requirement of proportionality.199 He 
claims that in the case of multiple terrorist bases in different states, multiple 
acts of self-defense in different states would each have to be proportional, 
once the requirement of necessity and armed attack or imminent threat of 
potential armed attacks are met in each state.200 This possibility was also 
raised during the Falklands/Malvinas conflict of 1982.201  
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Against the backdrop of the purpose of the proportionality requirement, the 
approaches by Kress and Lubell insist on the standard that the measures 
taken must be balanced against the removal of the threat. By way of contrast, 
Schmitt argues that striking the terrorist cell alone might be proportionate in 
itself. The approaches, those of Kress and Lubell, on the one hand, appear 
be favourable due to their conformity with the nature of proportionality. 
Schmitt, on the other hand, does not require the removal of an imminent 
threat and appears to endanger the principle of proportionality when the 
target is a terrorist cell. Under his approach, targeting a terrorist cell would be 
proportional under any circumstances.  
 
Under Lubell’s approach, the situations in Pakistan and Yemen themselves 
do not meet the requirement of an armed attack and it is questionable if the 
requirement of necessity is met in each state. Therefore, any act of self-
defense is not proportionate in this instance. 
 
Based on the assumption that the programme of targeted killings carried out 
by the United States is an incident of pre-emptive self-defense, this 
assumption raises some very important questions. The threat under the 
concept of pre-emptive self-defense is very vague and often not identifiable. 
Conversely, it is questionable in how far a removal of such a threat can be 
assessed which again endangers the principle of proportionality. Therefore, 
based on the assumption that targeted killing is conducted as pre-emptive 
self-defense, such actions are not proportional. This also explains why 
Schmitt does not call for a removal of the threat. 
 
Eventually, the requirement of proportionality regarding the drone strikes by 
the United States in Pakistan and Yemen has to be scrutinised on a case-by-
case basis, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
d. The Territorial Limitation of the Right of Self-Defense 
The conduct of targeted killings by the United States in Yemen and Pakistan 
raised another very important point regarding the right of self-defense. 
Assuming that the United States is at “war” with al-Qaeda and its affiliates 
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due to the attacks of 9/11, one has to remember that these attacks were 
conducted by a terrorist group based in Afghanistan at that time.202 For this 
reason, the United States invaded the state of Afghanistan in 2001.203 As 
already stated above, one may argue that the attacks of 9/11 constitute an 
armed attack under article 51 of the UN Charter and therefore trigger the 
right of self-defense. For the sake of this paper I have assumed that such an 
armed attack might come from a non-state actor.204 However, this raises the 
question whether such a right of self-defense may simply be transferred to 
other countries where that terrorist group is based or whether the right of 
self-defense is geographically limited to the state from whose territory the 
non-state armed attack occurs, which is supported by few scholars.205  
 
On one hand, Kress argues that the right of self-defense is geographically 
limited to the state from whose territory the armed attack occurs.206 It is 
argued that article 51 of the UN Charter has an inter-state character that 
aims to justify the use of force by a state on the territory of another state in 
order to repel an armed attack from a non-state actor.207 Moreover, the 
gravity of violence or threat must be scrutinised for each state itself in order 
to determine whether the requirement of an armed attack under article 51 
has been fulfilled.208 Therefore, the mere presence of a terrorist group in a 
state is not sufficient reason to attack that state. Lubell comes to the same 
conclusion when he recognises that the right of self-defense must be limited 
by assessing each situation in each territory.209 The only point of divergence 
between Kress and Lubell is that the latter does not recognise an in-built 
geographical limitation on the right of self-defense and therefore sets up the 
limitation within the proportionality test. 210  Both commentators, however, 
recognise the same tool for limiting the scope of the right of self-defense.  
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On the other hand, one may argue that there is no geographical limitation on 
the right of self-defense. Kress states that in reality there is only one non-
state actor against whom self-defense is directed and that it is not important 
whether that non-state actor is operating from more than one state’s 
territory.211 Schmitt argues that although territorial integrity is an essential 
foundation of international relations, it is not unlimited and conditional.212 
Against that backdrop, Security Council Resolution 1373 requires states to 
prevent the commission of terrorist attacks and deny safe haven to those 
who finance, plan, support or commit terrorist acts.213 Furthermore, according 
to the 1954 Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind, the toleration of the use by armed bands as a base of operations 
may amount to an offence against peace and security.214 This was also 
reflected by the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate Terrorism.215 
Schmitt concludes that, if a sanctuary state is tolerating terrorist groups 
within its territory, that state’s territorial integrity may be limited, which leads 
to the “non-consensual penetration” of territorial integrity and sovereignty.216 
This argument simply results in a permission of targeted killing without any 
territorial limitations under the right of self-defense.  
 
This view is also reflected by the US position on the issue of targeted killing 
where al-Qaeda constitutes the non-state actor.217 The US Department of 
Justice argues that the use of military force need not be restricted to “hot” 
battlefields such as Afghanistan.218 Furthermore, the United States argues 
that the Authorisation for the Use of Military Force (AUMF)219 would not 
provide a geographical limitation based on the Hamdan case220 and therefore 
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the use of force, in the form of targeted killing, shall not be bound by a 
geographical limitation. The White Paper bases its argumentation on a 
domestic case221 and simply assumes its application and compliance with 
international-law standards. 222  However, such an extension of the 
geographical limitation of the right of self-defense puts territories that do not 
constitute a so called “hot” battlefield in jeopardy. Moreover, it does not 
correspond with the idea as the right of self-defense of an exceptional and 
strictly limited right.223  
 
A suspension of geographical limitation does not therefore comply with the 
standards of the right of self-defense. Furthermore, targeted killing that 
occurs in the territory of a state where the terrorist group is merely located, 
cannot be justified with the right of self-defense. The situation in each state – 
in this case Pakistan and Yemen – must meet the requirement of an armed 
attack, immediacy, necessity and proportionality. It is not clear whether these 
countries are unable or unwilling to prevent operations of al-Qaeda. Based 
on the requirements of immediacy, necessity and proportionality, neither is 
evidently fulfilled in this case. If we apply the approach that the right of self-
defense has to be geographically limited, then we see that neither state 
meets the requirement to justify an attack. Therefore, the right of self-defense 
cannot be extended to the territory of Pakistan or Yemen.  
 
 
V. The Armed Conflict Model under IHL 
The law of armed conflict distinguishes between an International Armed 
Conflict (IAC) and a Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC).224 The regime 
of armed conflict can be triggered only by the existence of an armed conflict, 
whether international or non-international. 225  Therefore, this chapter 
examines whether targeted killing can be subsumed under the armed conflict 
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model. I also examine the existence of an armed conflict regarding the US 




1. Definition of an International Armed Conflict and Non-International 
Armed Conflict under the IHL Regime 
The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols do not contain a definition 
of the concept of an armed conflict. 226  However, the drafters of these 
conventions and protocols deliberately left out a detailed definition of that 
term in order to prevent a too restrictive application of the IHL regime.227  
 
In 1960, Jean Pictet defined an armed conflict as “any difference arising 
between States and leading to the intervention of members of armed 
forces”.228 This definition was not well accepted and was criticised due to its 
focus on international armed conflicts and the exclusion of non-international 
armed conflicts.229  
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) stated 
in the Tadic case that  
 
“an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force 
between States or protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within a 
State.”230  
 
Furthermore, on the temporal scope of the applicability of IHL, the ICTY 
concluded that:  
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“international humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed 
conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general 
conclusion of peace is reached; or in the case of internal conflicts, a 
peaceful settlement is achieved.”231  
 
Regarding the geographical applicability of IHL, the ICTY stated that:  
 
“international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of 
the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory 
under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place 
there.”232  
 
IHL differentiates between an international and non-international armed 
conflict. The international armed conflict is defined by common article 2 of the 
Geneva Conventions, which covers “all cases of declared war or of any other 
any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High 
Contracting Parties”.233 An armed conflict within the meaning of article 2 also 
exists when one of the parties denies the existence of a state of war.234 It 
makes no difference how lengthy the conflict, the extent of the slaughter or 
how numerous the participating forces are. 235  In case of the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict, the Israeli Supreme Court concluded in the Targeted 
Killings case that an armed conflict between an occupying state and a non-
state entity constitutes an international armed conflict. 236  However, this 
conclusion was not confirmed by other cases on targeted killings before the 
Court and the armed conflict was later classified as a non-international 
armed conflict by that same Court.237 
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Non-international armed conflicts are governed by common article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions.238 This article covers  
 
“all situations of sufficiently intense or protracted armed violence 
between identifiable and organized armed groups regardless of their 
place of occurrence, as long as they are not of interstate character”.239  
 
Furthermore, Additional Protocol II (AP II) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949 defines non-international armed conflict as armed conflicts:  
 
“which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its 
armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed 
groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a 
part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and 
concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.”240  
 
By way of comparison with the Geneva Conventions, the AP II gives a more 
detailed definition of a non-international armed conflict. However, it is 
questionable whether AP II is also binding on states which are not a party to 
that treaty. Leading commentators have concluded that some provisions 
might have become customary international law, even if there is no consent 
on the selection of provisions. 241  Therefore, parts of the AP II have a 
customary character, however, it is unclear which provisions of this protocol 
have become customary international law. 
 
Moreover, the ICTY developed a definition of a non-international armed 
conflict in the Tadic case.242 The ICTY concluded that a non-international 
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armed conflict can also exist where a state is not involved and there is a 
protracted armed violence between organised armed groups within a 
state.243 A fair amount of the literature suggests that this finding reflects or 
creates new customary international law.244 For the purpose of this paper, I 
accept this view and regard the Tadic decision as customary international 
law.  
 
In recent years, there has been the call to remove the distinction between an 
international and a non-international armed conflict, due to the special 
situation of transnational terrorist groups and networks.245 The ICTY has 
already stated in the Tadic case that in modern warfare distinquishing 
between international and non-international armed conflicts no longer makes 
sense.246 However, state practice and opinio juris do not support this view.247 
The distinction between international and non-international therefore remains 
decisive under the paradigm of IHL. 
 
In this regard, the US government suggested at one point that the conflict 
with al-Qaeda would constitute a new category of an armed conflict, because 
the traditional armed conflict model would be unable to cover the issue of a 
conflict against a transnational terrorist group.248 It is questionable, however, 
whether a new model is the right step when the international community still 
lacks a common definition of terrorism.249 Therefore, this paper examines 
targeted killing only under the known distinction of international and non-
international within the scope of IHL. 
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2. The Requirement of Armed Conflict in the “War on Terrorism” 
As previously stated, the form of a transnational terrorist group does not fit 
easily into the classic model of armed conflict. If we accept the concept of 
transnational terrorism, we need to reconsider the dichotomy of international 
and non-international armed conflicts.250 The bottom line, however, is that 
there has to be an armed conflict within the meaning of IHL before the law of 
armed conflict becomes applicable. 
 
a. Parties to the Conflict 
An “armed conflict” requires “parties to the conflict” to be identifiable by 
objective criteria.251  After the attacks of 9/11 in 2001 the United States 
declared a “war on terrorism”.252 It is highly questionable whether the “war on 
terrorism” fulfils the requirements of an armed conflict. However, that “war”, 
as a global enterprise with an uncertain duration and uncertain frontlines, 
was integrated into the National Security Strategy 2002 of the United 
States.253 Moreover, the 2002 strategy shows that at this time the United 
States was already describing the “war on terror” as a different kind of armed 
conflict with global effects that has to be fought on “many fronts” which are 
not exclusively within the state of the United States.254  
 
It is questionable, however, in how far the requirements for a “party to the 
conflict” are met in the case of the “war on terrorism”. The expression of 
“party to the conflict” requires that two or more organised groups of 
individuals have to be identifiable on an objective basis and that the 
organised groups must resort to armed violence which reaches the relevant 
threshold of an armed conflict.255 
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From a legal perspective, the mere declaration of a “war on terrorism” by the 
United States does not fulfil the requirements of the constitution for an armed 
conflict under IHL.256 First, its duration is unpredictable and its frontlines are 
not clearly defined.257 Secondly, the 2002 National Security Strategy does 
not specify the non-state actor constituting the enemy in the “war on terror”258 
– merely stating that “the enemy is terrorism”.259 
 
The problems regarding the requirement of the “parties to the conflict” were 
addressed by the Obama Administration. They specified the frontlines 
against the “war on terrorism” in the National Security Strategy 2010 to be 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Yemen. 260  Moreover, the 2010 strategy 
describes a “war” against “al Qa’ida and its affiliates”.261 One may argue that 
the reference to “al Qa’ida and its affiliates” is more precise and fulfils the 
requirement of “parties to the conflict”. However, one may also argue that 
such an expression is still too vague and not specific enough. For the sake of 
argument, I accept the view that this requirement is met in the “war on 
terrorism”. 
 
b. State v Non-State Party as International Armed Conflict  
As mentioned above, an international armed conflict generally comprises two 
High Contracting Parties.262 Nevertheless, an international armed conflict can 
also exist when one state acknowledges the non-state actor as belligerent.263 
In this case, it is highly unlikely that the United States would recognise al-
Qaeda as a belligerent and acknowledge the rights of a belligerent for its 
members under IHL. Furthermore, even if the United States were to 
recognise al-Qaeda as a belligerent, the conflict cannot be considered an 
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international armed conflict within the meaning of common article 2 of the 
Geneva Conventions, due to the non-state party form of al-Qaeda.264  
 
When considering cross-border actions carried out by the United States into 
foreign territories such as Yemen, Afghanistan or Pakistan, one might argue 
that, due to the use of lethal force on foreign territory, the requirements of an 
international armed conflict are met.265 In this case, the absence of actual 
fighting would be irrelevant.266 This approach appears to be strongly artificial 
and implies that the attacks by the terrorist group would be attributed to the 
group’s host state.267  
 
However, the Supreme Court of Israel concluded in the Targeted Killings 
case that Israel acted in a situation of international armed conflict.268 In this 
case, the Court based its conclusion on the circumstances of an ongoing 
occupation by a state and a terrorist group acting in the same area.269 Such a 
situation cannot directly be transferred to the situation of the US programme 
of targeted killings carried out in Pakistan or Yemen as no ongoing 
occupation by the United States is – or has ever been – in place. 
 
Therefore, the “war on terror” and, especially, that on al-Qaeda in Pakistan 
and Yemen cannot be considered an international armed conflict under IHL 
rules.  
 
c. State v Non-State Party as Non-International Armed Conflict 
Based on the assumption that “protracted armed violence between 
governmental authorities and organized armed groups” 270  is part of the 
definition of a non-international armed conflict, one has to question whether 
the requirement of “protracted armed violence” is met in the case of the 
United States against al-Qaeda. On one hand, it is argued that from 1990 
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until 2001 at least six attacks were carried out on US targets.271 In addition, 
since 11 September 2001, several terrorist attacks attributable to al-Qaeda 
have taken place. 272  Owing to the lack of an agreed definition on the 
requirement of violence, one may argue that these attacks fulfil the 
requirement of protracted violence and do not constitute sporadic events. On 
the other hand, some commentators suggest that six or so attacks over a 
period of 11 years constitute merely sporadic acts of violence.273 For the 
sake of this paper, I follow the approach that the threshold of armed violence 
has been reached between the United States and al-Qaeda.  
 
Targeted killing is characterised by a state that crosses its borders to kill 
suspected terrorists within the borders of another state.274 However, it is 
contentious whether the “war on terrorism” can be considered as a non-
international armed conflict, due to its extra-territorial nature. 
 
One approach in determining a non-international armed conflict recognises 
that even a conflict between a state and a non-state actor outside the 
targeting state may be considered as a non-international armed conflict.275 
This approach is supported by common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 
which reflects customary international law276 in that it covers “the case of 
armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of 
one of the High Contracting Parties”.277 Therefore, article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions only requires a conflict within the territory of one High 
Contracting Party. Furthermore, it does not limit a non-international armed 
conflict only to those taking place in the territory of a state between its own 
armed forces and a non-state actor. Under this wide interpretation of a non-
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international armed conflict, the war on al-Qaeda may constitute this 
description of conflict. One might argue that, as states such as Afghanistan, 
Yemen or Pakistan are state parties to the Geneva Convention,278 each 
constitutes a High Contracting Party. In line with this approach, the targeted 
killings in Pakistan and Yemen occur under a non-international armed conflict. 
 
In contrast, a more restrictive approach requires a geographical limitation of 
the non-international armed conflict, which can be found only within the 
territorial borders of the targeting state.279 Supporters of this approach rely on 
article 1 of the AP II, which limits a non-international armed conflict to the 
territory of the concerned state.280 Assuming a geographical limitation of the 
non-international armed conflict model, Yemen and Pakistan could only 
constitute a condition of non-international armed conflict, if the situation in 
each state could be determined as such or if each state gave its consent to a 
programme of targeted killings carried out by the targeting state.281 Based on 
the assumption that neither of these two states constitute a situation of non-
international armed conflict or would give their consent, the armed conflict 
model could not apply here. 
 
Following the wide interpretation based on common article 3, a suspension of 
a geographical limitation would result in a threat to civilians who live in areas 
not constituting a so-called “hot” battlefield. Moreover, a suspension of 
geographical limitation could make the distinction between an international 
and non-international armed conflict redundant. In the case of a wide 
interpretation of common article 3, this gives the targeting state a licence to 
kill without territorial limitations, as long as a terrorist group is present within 
each targeted state’s territory. Any state in which a terrorist group is active 
must fear the use of lethal trans-border force against it without even 
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intentionally becoming involved in an armed conflict or constituting a non-
international armed conflict. 
 
A comparison of the Geneva Conventions and the AP II reveals that the 
former are customary international law and are therefore binding upon the 
whole international community.282 In contrast, although the AP II is partly 
customary in character, it does not entirely reflect customary international law 
and is therefore binding only upon its states parties.283 The ICJ has also 
concluded that common article 3 has to do with “elementary considerations 
of humanity” and therefore comprises a general principle of international 
law.284 Furthermore, the mere fact that the actual fighting occurs outside the 
territory of the concerned state does not mean that it cannot be classified as 
a non-international armed conflict.285 At the same time, an armed conflict 
may not be determined in this manner solely by its occurrence outside the 
territory of the concerned state.286  
 
Nevertheless, regarding the specifics of transnational terrorist groups, 
common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions appears to be appropriate as it 
neither requires the involvement of the armed forces of the territorial state 
nor a political link to the territorial state by any party to the conflict.287 The 
travaux preparatoires also do not exclude the possibility of a non-
international armed conflict occurring in more than a single state.288  
 
In addition, the appearance of a non-international armed conflict outside the 
territory of the concerned state against a non-state actor without the 
involvement of the territorial state is not a new phenomenon in practice. 
Examples of this include actions by the United States against the Vietcong in 
Cambodia, by Israel against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon; by Turkey 
against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in northern Iraq or by Uganda 
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against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Sudan.289  All these cases 
support the conclusion that the law of non-international armed conflict is able 
to cover a situation against a transnational terrorist group, where the 
concerned state acts outside its territorial borders.290 
 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of the United States confirmed the wider 
view and concluded in the Hamdan case that the conflict between the United 
States and al-Qaeda is a non-international armed conflict. 291  The Court 
based its conclusion on the interpretation of common article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions.292 The ECHR has also concluded that the conflict between 
Turkey and the PKK in Iraq has to be classified as a non-international armed 
conflict.293 
 
Moreover, supporters of the wider approach argue that common articles 2 
and 3 are complementary in covering situation of armed conflicts.294 If a 
situation of transnational terror were not even covered by common article 3, 
this would create an area which would not be covered by customary 
international rules and might lead to arbitrary conduct. However, I examine 
the need for a new model regarding transnational terrorism further below. For 
the purpose of additional examination of targeted killing under the law of non-
international armed conflict, I assume that the “war on terror” falls under the 
model of a non-international conflict under common article 3.  
 
 
3. The Application of the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict to 
Targeted Killing 
One of the fundamental principles of the law of armed conflict is the principle 
of distinction. 295  The principle of distinction, which reflects customary 
international law and may be considered as part of jus cogens,296 requires 
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that the parties to the conflict distinguish between civilians and 
combatants.297 An attack may be directed against combatants only and not 
against civilians.298 These fundamental principles applicable to international 
armed conflicts are also recognised as a customary rule in situations of non-
international armed conflicts.299  
 
a. Persons Subject to Direct Attack 
In contrast to a situation of an international armed conflict, the rule whether 
someone can be lawfully subject to direct attack is less clear under the model 
of non-international armed conflict. Kretzmer argues that “the use of the term 
‘civilians’ in AP II is based on the assumption there must be ‘non-
civilians’”.300 Bothe concludes the existence of two categories of persons 
under the law of non-international armed conflict: fighters and civilians.301 
This leads to the questions: How should a “fighter” be defined under the law 
of non-international armed conflict, and how may a terrorist fit into that 
category? One may also question whether a terrorist can be considered as a 
combatant. In this context, there is no answer and not even an attempt by 
international instruments to answer the question whether a terrorist may be 
considered as a combatant.302 States are unwilling to grant an opposing non-
state actor the status of a combatant as such an act would legitimise the non-
state actor’s conduct, which may lead to undesirable results for the states.303 
However, even if there is no definition of a combatant under a non-
international armed conflict, this does not automatically mean that there are 
no individuals that may be targeted under the law of non-international armed 
conflict. 304  Should no group or individuals be identified as fighters, the 
essential principle of distinction would be bypassed and all individuals could 
be considered as civilians.305 Therefore, due to the principle of distinction, 
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there have to be individuals that may lawfully be targeted in a non-
international armed conflict.306  
 
A determination as a fighter in a non-international armed conflict may be 
reached only by identifying the parties to the conflict.307 While the AP II states 
that non-international armed conflict has to occur between the armed forces 
of a High Contracting Party “and dissident armed forces or organized armed 
groups”,308 common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions does not lay down 
such a requirement.309 However, it is agreed that common article 3 requires 
an organised group to fulfil the requirements set for the parties to the 
conflict.310 If we subsume a terrorist under the prerequisites of an organised 
group, then he or she has to be regarded as a part of an organised group 
and, therefore, as a person who may be targeted.  
 
At this point we have to differentiate between the privileges of a fighter and 
their targetability.311 Being a fighter does not confer the privilege of immunity 
for conduct during wartime as the status of combatant does.312 It merely 
indicates that the other party may target that fighter.313 This is also the view 
of the ICRC Commentary, which states that “those who belong to armed 
forces or armed groups may be attacked at any time”.314 The targetable 
person has therefore to be an “active member” of an organised armed 
group.315 This leads to the question: How is an “active member” defined? 
 
The scope of an active member is difficult to define. It appears to be easy in 
the case of actual combat. However, issues arise in cases where the person 
concerned is merely a member of the terrorist group or is financially 
supporting that group. According to common article 3, it is prohibited to use 
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violence against “persons taking no active part in hostilities”.316 In addition, 
article 13(3) of the AP II protects civilians “unless for such time as they take 
direct part in hostilities”.317 One may infer from these two provisions that 
individuals who take direct part in hostilities may be considered as an “active 
member” and, therefore, targeted, which will be examined in the next section. 
 
b. Direct Participation in Hostilities 
In order to define the scope of direct participation in hostilities, one first has 
to clarify the meaning of “hostilities”. Hostilities are not defined expressly 
under IHL. 318  The term has been interpreted both permissively and 
restrictively. The permissive approach covers all activities related to building 
up military capacity.319 The restrictive approach to “hostilities” covers only 
activities that are related to actual combat.320  
 
The expression “direct participation in hostilities” is also not clearly 
defined.321 Attempts at formulating a definition usually distinguish between 
“direct participation” and “contribution”.322 As noted by the ICRC: 
 
“To restrict [direct participation] to combat and active military operations 
would too narrow, while extending it to the entire war effort would be too 
broad, as in modern warfare the whole population participates in the war 
effort to some extent, albeit indirectly. The population cannot on this 
ground be considered to be combatants …”323 
 
Schmitt argues that “direct participation” requires activities that result in a 
direct adverse impact on the enemy and are associated with traditional 
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combat activities.324 That requirement would be met in cases of attacking the 
enemy, its material or facilities, acting as members of a gun crew or 
gathering military intelligence in the area of hostilities.325 He also identifies 
“contributions” such as media campaigns, political lobbying or decision-
making as general war effort that does not result in any direct harm to the 
enemy.326  
 
However, there is still no clarity regarding activities that constitute “direct 
participation in hostilities” – beside active military operations.327 In response 
to this, the ICRC has developed an official interpretive guide in order to 
determine “direct participation in hostilities”, which requires three criteria that 
have to be met cumulatively: 
 
1. The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or 
military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict 
death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected against 
direct attack (threshold of harm). 
2. There must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to 
result either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of 
which that act constitutes an integral part (direct causation). 
3. The act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required 
threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detriment 
of another (belligerent nexus).328 
 
In practice, the ICRC approach to setting up these cumulative requirements 
has its difficulties.329 For example, the case of a spiritual leader who is not 
directly involved in military operations would not meet all the criteria set by 
the ICRC. The guidance of the ICRC is helpful in cases of persons who are 
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directly involved in a military operation – such as a bomb-maker. However, 
targeted killings are not always directed at the bomb-maker. Sometimes it is 
the spiritual leader who is targeted by states.330 In this context, Melzer states 
that merely building up military capacity does not amount to “direct 
participation in hostilities”. 331  If an individual were not to fulfil the 
requirements of the ICRC, he or she is not taking direct part in hostilities, is 
not a fighter and may therefore not lawfully be targeted. Under the principle 
of distinction such person would be protected as a civilian from any direct 
attack. 
 
Schmitt suggests an alternative approach:  
“The civilian must have engaged in action that he knew would harm (or 
otherwise disadvantage) the enemy in a relatively direct and immediate 
way. The participation must have been part of the process by which a 
particular use of force was rendered possible, either through preparation 
or execution. It is not necessary that the individual foresaw the eventual 
result of the operation, but only that he knew their participation was 
indispensable to a discrete hostile act or series of related acts.”332  
 
In contrast to the approach adopted by the ICRC, Schmitt requires an 
additional mental element on the part of the engaged civilian. Under the 
mental element, the civilian does not need to have knowledge of the eventual 
result of the operation. The decisive point is the knowledge of participation in 
a hostile act and the knowledge of harming the enemy. 
 
It is widely accepted that an interpretation of “direct participation in hostilities” 
must be  
 
“narrow enough to protect civilians and maintain the meaning of the 
principle of distinction, while broad enough to meet the legitimate need of 
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the armed forces to respond to the means and methods of warfare that 
might be used by civilians.”333  
 
One may argue that Schmitt’s interpretation is appropriate in order to protect 
the principle of distinction and meets the legitimate needs of the armed 
forces.334 Furthermore, his approach reflects international jurisprudence.335 
Applying this approach to the case of targeted killings, a civilian would lose 
his or her protection by engaging in conduct such as:  
• directing, planning and executing acts of violence;  
• delivering weapons to an active firing position;  
• providing sanctuary to persons executing an attack, immediately 
preceding an attack or hiding them immediately after an attack, and  
• providing communications for purposes of facilitating an attack.336 
 
However, Schmitt’s interpretation is also less clear-cut in the case of the 
above-mentioned spiritual leader. In terms of his interpretation, the conduct 
of the spiritual leader may be classified as “direct participation in hostilities”, if 
he or she:  
• knew that the engaged action would harm the enemy in a direct and 
immediate way; 
• enabled the use of force through their participation in the preparation or 
execution of the act, and  
• knew that their participation was indispensable to a discrete hostile act or 
series of related acts.  
 
The application of Schmitt’s interpretation illustrates that it is strongly 
dependent on mental or subjective requirements. The requirements of 
knowledge regarding the harm to the enemy or knowledge that the 
participation was indispensable, set the burden of proof very high in this 
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context. However, that assessment is at the discretion of the targeting state, 
which is not reviewable at the time the decision is made.  
 
Schmitt’s approach makes it easier for states to determine that a civilian is 
directly participating in hostilities and it is wider than the approach by the 
ICRC. The ICRC approach may be not comprehensive, but leaves less 
space for interpretation and discretion, which limits the possibility of misuse. 
It appears to be more appropriate to the determination of when an individual 
may or may not be subject to direct attacks. 
 
The final decision as to whether a person is directly participating in hostilities 
has to be made on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, the ICRC and 
Schmitt’s approaches are helpful guidelines when interpreting direct 
participation in hostilities. 
 
 
c. Temporal Scope of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
One of the characteristics of suspected terrorists is that these persons may 
only temporarily support terrorist groups. Therefore, they do not always form 
a consistent part of that terrorist group. 
 
In this context, due to conventional and customary IHL, civilians enjoy 
protection, “unless and for such time as” they directly participate in 
hostilities.337 That suspension of protection applies to both international and 
non-international armed conflicts.338 However, the wording of “unless and for 
such time as” in the AP I and AP II raises the question how long direct 
participation in hostilities lasts. A decisive point here lies in the “revolving 
door theory” which refers to the great benefit which civilians and/or terrorists 
can enjoy both as a combatant / fighter and as a civilian.339 Under the 
“revolving door theory”, terrorists “can remain civilians most of the time and 
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endanger their protection as civilians only while actually in the process of 
carrying out a terrorist act”.340 
 
One approach in attempting to define the temporal scope of direct 
participation in hostilities is the “specific acts” approach. Under this approach, 
“unless and for such time as” has to interpreted in a restrictive way, so that 
the civilian protection against direct attack is suspended only for the time of 
each specific hostile act that contributes to the direct participation in 
hostilities.341 This approach was adopted in the jurisprudence of the IACiHR: 
 
“The persons who participated in the attack on the military base were 
legitimate military targets only for such time as they actively participated 
in the fighting.”342 (emphasis added) 
 
“It is important to understand that while these persons forfeit their 
immunity from direct attack while participating in hostilities, they, 
nonetheless, retain their status as civilians. Unlike ordinary combatants, 
once they cease their hostile acts, they can no longer be attacked, 
although they may be tried and punished for all their belligerent acts.”343 
(emphasis added) 
 
The same interpretation is also reflected by the ICRC Commentary on the 
AP I and AP II.344  
 
Although it appears logical to restrict the suspension of civilian protection to 
each hostile act, the parties to the conflict would certainly not conduct large-
scale hostilities on the basis of the “specific acts” approach.345 Furthermore, 
this restrictive approach seems to be practicable only under the premise that 
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the term “civilian” does not include organised armed actors. 346  In this 
connection, Melzer states that the “specific acts” approach may be 
appropriate to avoid  
 
“mistaken or arbitrary targeting to the maximum extent possible while 
limiting the risk of abuse of the ‘revolving door’ of civilian protection to 
individuals whose involvement in the hostilities is merely unorganized, 
spontaneous or sporadic and, therefore, cannot pose a significant 
military challenge to the organized armed forces of the parties to the 
conflict”.347  
 
Another approach regarding the determination of the temporal scope of 
“direct participation in hostilities” is the “affirmative disengagement” approach. 
Under this approach, civilians lose their protection until they “affirmatively 
disengage” from “direct participation in hostilities” in an objective manner 
noticeable to the opposing party.348  
 
This approach has found some support in legal doctrine. Schmitt states: 
 
“If civilians could repeatedly opt in and out of hostilities, combatants 
victimized by their activities will quickly lose respect for the law, thereby 
exposing the civilian population as a whole to greater danger … The best 
approach is therefore the only one that is practical in actual combat 
operations. Once an individual has opted into the hostilities, he or she 
remains a valid military objective until unambiguously opting out. This 
may occur through extended non-participation or an affirmative act of 
withdrawal. Further, since the individual who directly participated did not 
enjoy any privilege to engage in hostilities, it is reasonable that he or she 
assume the risk that the other side is unaware of such withdrawal.”349  
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Watkin also supports this approach: 
 
“As long as civilians perform the functions of combatants, such as 
planning, command, and the actual conduct of operations, they remain 
liable to attack. There is a danger that the term “for such time” will lead to 
an interpretation that civilians are only combatants while they carry a 
weapon and revert to civilian status once they throw down a rifle or return 
home from a day in the trenches. This has been referred to as a 
‘revolving door’ of protection for certain civilians.”350 
 
“In order for humanitarian law to provide effective protection for civilians 
there can be no revolving door of participation in hostilities … Evidence 
of a civilian no longer acting like a combatant could include surrender, 
taking a form of parole, giving up weapons and similar overt credible 
acts.”351 
 
During the 2005 ICRC/Asser Expert Meeting on “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities”, the “affirmative disengagement” approach was favoured over the 
“specific acts” approach due to the latter’s too narrow interpretation. 352 
However, the “affirmative disengagement” approach was also criticised as 
impractical.353 Moreover, one may critique the difficulty and uncertainty in 
determining whether an individual has objectively disengaged from any direct 
participation in hostilities. One may also disagree with the notion that the 
individual bears the risk of a lack of knowledge on the part of the opposing 
party.354 In addition, even if the case of a clear declaration of disengagement 
could be made in one case, such an open disengagement bears the risk of 
reprisals by the organised armed group from which the person is 
disengaging. 355  Therefore, the “affirmative disengagement” approach 
appears unsuitable for the group of unorganised civilians. Furthermore, from 
a humanitarian perspective, applying this approach would permit a direct 
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attack on unorganised civilians who do not pose a immediate military 
threat.356  Therefore, the “affirmative disengagement” approach has to be 
restricted to organised armed actors and should not apply to unorganised 
civilians.  
Because both approaches produce problems, a comprehensive compromise 
was developed during the ICRC/Asser Expert Meeting in 2005: 
 
“[A] wider agreement appeared to emerge that a distinction had to be 
made between unorganized civilians and ‘non-combatant’ members of 
organized armed groups on the one hand, and fighting members of such 
groups on the other. There was preference for applying the ‘specific acts 
approach’ to unorganized civilians and ‘non-combatant’ members of 
organized armed groups and the ‘affirmative disengagement approach’ 
to fighting members of such groups. A determination that affirmative 
disengagement had taken place would depend on the concrete 
circumstances of the context and could not be defined in advance.”357 
 
This compromise covers the difficulties of the “specific acts” approach and 
the “affirmative disengagement” approach. Moreover, it reflects the functional 
“membership” approach illustrated in the next part. 
 
As already mentioned, the “membership” approach combines the “specific 
acts” approach and the “affirmative disengagement” approach. Furthermore, 
it is based on the presumption that a member of an organised armed group 
loses his or her protection from direct attack for the entire time of his or her 
membership of that group.358 Only an unorganised civilian may benefit from 
the “revolving door” possibility under the “membership approach”.359 This 
approach was adopted by the Israeli Supreme Court in the Targeted Killings 
case: 
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“On the one hand, a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities one single 
time, or sporadically, who later detaches himself from that activity, is a 
civilian who, starting from the time he detached himself from that activity, 
is entitled to protection from attack. He is not to be attacked for the 
hostilities which he committed in the past. On the other hand, a civilian 
who has joined a terrorist organization which has become his ‘home’, 
and in the framework of his role in that organization he commits a chain 
of hostilities, with short periods of rest between them, loses his immunity 
from attack ‘for such time’ as he is committing the chain of acts. Indeed, 
regarding such a civilian, the rest between hostilities is nothing other than 
preparation for the next hostility …”360 
 
Furthermore, the “membership approach” also reflects article 43 of the AP I. 
This article states that organised armed forces, groups or units under a 
command responsible to a party to the conflict lose civilian status and 
become combatants.361 However, the “membership approach” bears the risk 
that any member of the organised armed group may be the subject of direct 
attack at any time, regardless of his or her function within that group. The 
ICRC/Asser Expert Meeting attempted to address the issue by categorising 
“fighting members” within the “membership approach”.362 A “fighting member” 
was described as a member that regularly takes part in hostilities.363 This 
would reduce the risk of collateral damage.364 During the meeting, it was also 
stated that under the “membership approach”, members who have 
differentiated or geographically separated from the group may be targeted 
only on the basis of the “specific acts” approach.365  
 
The examination of the temporal scope of “direct participation in hostilities” 
has shown that protection from direct attack is granted only to those civilians 
who are unorganised and whose participation in hostilities is merely sporadic 
or spontaneous. Only such civilians may benefit from the “revolving door” 
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and may regain their protection as civilians as soon as their specific act of 
hostility ends. The examination above has also shown that members of an 
organised armed group do not profit from the “revolving door” theory. In this 
case, there has to be a clear disengagement from that organised armed 
group in order for them to regain their protection as civilians. 
 
Such an examination of “direct participation in hostilities” has, of necessity, to 
be conducted on a case-by-case basis for the cases of targeted killings in 
Pakistan and Yemen. 
 
d. Targeted Killing and Military Necessity under the Armed Conflict Model 
Should individuals be lawfully subject to a direct attack, that attack must still 
meet the requirement of military necessity.366 Military necessity, as set out in 
military manuals and emerging jurisprudence, is derived mainly from article 
14 of the Lieber Code which states: 
 
“Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, consists in 
the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing 
the end of the war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and 
usages of war.”367 
 
Military necessity permits the use of force under two cumulative 
requirements:  
• the force used is essential to achieving the objective of the war, and  
• the force used is in accordance with the rules and general principles of 
conventional and customary IHL.368  
 
These requirements have been confirmed in the Wilhelm List369 and Nuclear 
Weapons cases.370  
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Within the framework of targeted killing, military necessity does not grant a 
licence to kill without any limitations. Furthermore, the targeted killing must 
be essential to the  
 
“achievement of a concrete and direct military advantage without there 
being any non-lethal alternative which would entail a comparable benefit 
without unreasonable increasing the security risk of the operating forces 
or the civilian population”.371  
 
Again, the assessment of non-lethal alternatives has to be made on a case-
by-case basis. Furthermore, the validity of the assessment from the 
perspective of an academic analysis cannot be comprehensive.372 The UN 
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions has 
also raised doubts about the comprehensive assessment of non-lethal 
alternatives.373 An example of this is when Israeli forces opened fire in front 
of a café without any warning or attempt to arrest the suspected terrorists.374  
 
In this context, states should also bear in mind that targeted killings, when 
employed as a military strategy, should represent a step towards ending the 
conflict rather than inflaming a critical situation and thereby supporting the 
opposing party’s cause.375 In this context, cases like the attack on a wedding 
appear to be questionable against the backdrop that the force used has to be 
essential to achieve the object of war.376 
 
e. Targeted Killing and Proportionality 
Proportionality is a long-established principle, which requires that all 
measures taken must be proportionate to the legitimate goal sought.377 
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Whether the terrorist should be a legitimate military target and the killing 
meet the requirements of military necessity, the targeted killing must still be 
proportional. The principle of proportionality is also reflected in article 
51(5)(b) of the AP I that lists types of attack which “are to be considered as 
indiscriminate”:378  
 
“An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, 
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated.”379 
 
This provision is part of the AP I and applies to international armed conflicts. 
However, it also reflects the customary rule of proportionality which applies to 
international and non-international armed conflicts.380  
 
Targeted killing may be considered as “damage to civilian objects” or 
“incidental loss of civilian life” under article 51 of the AP I, when innocent 
civilians die during an attempt to kill a suspected terrorist.381 Such acts, if 
indiscriminate, are prohibited under article 51(5) and may result in 
disproportionality and unlawfulness.382 The case of Yemen and Pakistan, for 
instance, has shown that a large number of targeted killings also resulted in 
the loss of civilian life.383 In practice, it is not always clear how the principle of 
proportionality has to be interpreted or applied. 
 
In this regard, the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing 
Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia stated: 
 
“The main problem with the principle of proportionality is not whether or 
not it exists but what it means and how it is to be applied. It is relatively 
simple to state that there must be an acceptable relation between the 
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legitimate destructive effect and undesirable collateral effects … It is 
much easier to formulate the principle of proportionality in general terms 
that it is to apply it to a particular set of circumstances because the 
comparison is often between unlike quantities and values. One cannot 
easily assess the value of innocent human lives as opposed to capturing 
a particular military objective.”384 
 
This illustrates the difficulties in applying the principle of proportionality. The 
assessment of the value of innocent human lives as opposed to the military 
objective has to be done on a case-by-case basis. Such an assessment 
becomes even more difficult in a case of anticipated collateral damage or 
anticipated threat. 
 
One cannot deny that a high-value target will justify greater collateral 
damage than a low-value target.385 Moreover, “proportionality must be judged 
on the basis of the information available at the time of the attack, and not on 
the actual results”.386 In the case of killing or wounding individuals,  
 
“the burden rests on the state to show either that this could not 
reasonably have been foreseen, or that even if it could have been 
foreseen, the necessity of the attack was great enough to justify the 
risk”.387 
 
In the final event, the proportionality of each targeted killing must be 
scrutinised on a case-by-case basis. Although targeted killings claim to be 
“surgical” warfare,388 the practice in Pakistan and Yemen has shown that in a 
large number of cases they caused the death or injury of innocent civilians.389 
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Therefore, one may argue that this “surgical” warfare in Pakistan and Yemen 
in not proportionate. 
 
VI. The Need for a New Model? 
Targeted killing is not an area that can easily be subsumed within a particular 
model. Any attempt to do so raises a number of issues and it appears to be 
unlawful under any presented model.  
 
The law-enforcement model has its difficulties in explaining why the targeting 
state has jurisdiction and why this model should apply to targeted killing at all. 
It fails to argue why states should be allowed to the use lethal force in a 
foreign state. There is no legal basis for the use of lethal force of one state in 
the territory of another under the law-enforcement model. It also fails to 
explain why a domestic paradigm may apply to an inter-state issue. In this 
regard, one might argue that there is universal jurisdiction over transnational 
terrorism. However, there can be no universal jurisdiction if there is no legal 
definition of terrorism. Regarding the “generic qualification as law 
enforcement”, the concept based on “conduct and effect” as introduced by 
Melzer appears to be persuasive.390  
 
Moreover, even if the law-enforcement model aims to protect potential 
victims based on the right to life, it is questionable whether the scope of the 
right to life justifies an anticipated or pre-emptive use of force. Such 
constructs do not comply with the strict necessity test, which derives from the 
international human rights law.391 Furthermore, the law-enforcement model 
preserves no answer regarding protracted violence that has reached the 
level of a non-international armed conflict.  
 
Apart from its difficulties in finding application to the circumstances, the law-
enforcement model provides acceptable results, if one is aiming at balancing 
the rights of the suspects against the rights of potential victims.  
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The scrutiny of targeted killing under the model of the ius ad bellum also 
results in an incomplete coverage of targeted killing.  
 
Against the backdrop of the programme of targeted killings carried out by the 
United States in Pakistan and Yemen, the examination above illustrated the 
issue of a geographical limitation of the right of self-defense. One main point 
in this regard is that the mere presence of a terrorist group is not sufficient to 
justify targeted killing in the territory where that terrorist group is present. 
Such circumstances do not fulfil the requirement of necessity and armed 
attack.  
 
The controversial construction of pre-emptive self-defense is not persuasive 
and results in a temporal extension to the infinite, due to the wide 
interpretation of the requirement of immediacy. There may be situations 
where targeted killing may be justified under the right of self-defense. 
However, US practice in Yemen and Pakistan over the past 13 years shows 
approximately 500 confirmed drone strikes.392 But Yemen and Pakistan do 
not constitute a so-called “hot” battlefield and neither carried out an armed 
attack or constituted a threat that was instant, overwhelming, leaving no 
choice of means and no moment for deliberation. 
 
The examination of targeted killing in the context of the armed conflict model 
also illustrated five main problems. First, the term, “war on terrorism” is too 
wide and not specific enough. The United States failed to determine the 
exact battlefields of the “war on terrorism” in its declaration of “war on 
terrorism”.393  
 
Secondly, examining targeted killing under the model of international armed 
conflict showed that it cannot apply due to the non-state actor status of 
terrorist groups. 
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Thirdly, the application of the model of non-international armed conflict raised 
the problem of territorial limitation. 394  A suspension of the geographical 
limitation renders the distinction between an international and non-
international armed conflict pointless. Furthermore, it illustrates that the 
model of non-international armed conflict was not developed for the 
application on transnational terror and, in particular, targeted killing. 
  
Fourthly, assuming that the non-international armed conflict model were to 
apply, its application confirms the assumption that the drafters of the Geneva 
Conventions did not consider transnational terror when they developed 
provisions on IHL. The application of this model already falls short in 
determining the status of a terrorist. Expressions such as “unlawful 
combatant” / “fighter” or the different approaches in interpreting “direct 
participation in hostilities” appear to be artificial and constructed primarily for 
the purposes of killing terrorists. These artificial constructions endanger one 
of the main principles of IHL, namely, the principle of distinction.  
 
Fifthly, the armed conflict model does not contain an answer to states that do 
not constitute a territory of hostilities. Moreover, it tries to stretch the 
application of hostilities and puts the life of innocent civilians in jeopardy in 
order to avoid an extra-legal space. Therefore, even the armed conflict model 
does not provide a comprehensive coverage of the issue of targeted killing.  
 
In comparing all three models, the law-enforcement model appears to be 
most promising due to its strict restriction of when lethal force may be used. 
However, an entirely new model may be preferable, which I introduce in the 
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VII. Alternative Models 
Owing to the lack of a comprehensive model, Kretzmer attempts to take the 
best of two worlds, namely, the rules of IHL and international human rights 
law. I also define a draft of a new model in order to illustrate requirements 
that a new model must contain if it seeks to cover the issue of targeted killing 
of suspected terrorists comprehensively.  
 
1. The Mixed Model 
Kretzmer proposes a “mixed model” that comprises the law-enforcement 
model, the armed conflict model and the right of self-defense.395 This model 
basically draws a parallel with the requirement of necessity and 
proportionality under the right of self-defense.396 He denies the existence of 
an extralegal space in the case that IHL should not apply.397 Under the mixed 
model, states would be bound to international human rights law.398 Moreover, 
even if IHL and the law of armed conflict were to apply in a case of targeted 
killing, Kretzmer assumes that state actions under a non-international armed 
conflict have to be “constrained by the standards of international human 
rights law”.399 Therefore, the arbitrary deprivation of life is prohibited and due 
process principles must be respected.400 In this case, Kretzmer admits that 
there might be situations where the attack may be so imminent that law-
enforcement mechanisms must be replaced by the mechanisms of IHL.401 He 
argues that any situation must meet the standards for necessity and 
proportionality,402 and necessity means that “a state may not use force if 
there are other means of defending itself”.403 This requirement is not met in a 
situation where a possibility of putting the suspected terrorist on trial still 
exists and that again is strongly dependent on the control of the hosting 
state.404 In this context, the necessity test must require that the suspected 
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terrorist does constitute an imminent threat to the targeting state. 405 
Moreover, the necessity test requires that the host state is unwilling or unable 
to remove the threat.406  
 
Kretzmer suggests a proportionality test under the “mixed model” based on 
three factors: 
 
“1. The danger to life posed by the continued activities of the terrorists. 
2. The chance of the danger to human life being realized if the activities 
of the suspected terrorist are not halted immediately.  
3. The danger that civilians will be killed or wounded in the attack on the 
suspected terrorist.”407 
 
Kretzmer’s proposed proportionality test sets up a heavy burden for 
evaluating the danger posed by terrorist activities and the consequent 
collateral damage to civilians. This is congruent with his assumption that 
targeted killing resulting in the death of innocent civilians does not meet the 
requirement of proportionality.408  
 
The above-mentioned tests for necessity and proportionality go beyond the 
basic requirements for these principles under the armed conflict model. 
However, these stricter rules of necessity and proportionality comply with the 
ICJ’s conclusion in terms of which human rights treaties continue to apply in 
time of war, even if the law of armed conflict does constitute the lex specialis 
in that case.409 Moreover, such a mixed legal framework is nothing new as 
the ICJ concluded in the Wall case that human rights can be used as a gap-
filler in the case of a legal lacuna under IHL.410 The question is whether such 
a legal lacuna exists in the case of targeted killing. This, again, leads to the 
discussion in how far the armed conflict model applies. As shown in this 
paper, one may interpret the rules on a non-international armed conflict in a 
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way that there is no legal lacuna. In contrast, one may argue that the non-
international armed conflict model is not able to cover the issue of 
extraterritorial killing of suspected terrorist.411  
Another point of critique is that Kretzmer uses a very narrow interpretation of 
human rights treaties and therefore concludes that they fail to apply, due to 
the lack of jurisdiction.412 However, one may argue that some human rights 
have reached the status of customary international law or even jus 
cogens.413 Human rights that are protected under customary international law 
are binding on any state; this counters any argument about there being a 
lack of jurisdiction.  
 
In the final event, the “mixed model” is also not persuasive. It is based on the 
assumption that the paradigm of IHL applies primarily and that international 
human rights law shall restrict it. However, the assumption that the armed 
conflict model applies carries the risk that states will use this model to 
expand their actions in the “war against terrorism”. Targeting states appear to 
be keen of taking advantage from any discretion that they are given under 
the armed conflict model. Therefore, they will use this model in the absence 
of a clear indication as to when international human rights law applies; 
following this line of thinking, states will be keen to disregard the restrictions 
of international human rights law and will only apply IHL rules.  
 
2. Draft of a New Model 
All the introduced models fail to cover targeted killing of suspected terrorists 
comprehensively. The “mixed model”, which attempts to apply the best of two 
worlds, is also not persuasive. Therefore, in what follows, I set out 
requirements of a new model that could be designed in the future.  
 
First, such a model should define terms of “terrorism” and “battlefield”. One 
might argue that terrorism is nothing new. However, one cannot deny that the 
drafters of the Geneva Conventions did not consider transnational terrorism 
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when they drafted common article 3.414 Neither did the drafters envisage 
drone warfare.415 The issue of targeted killing in states such as Yemen or 
Pakistan shows, more than ever, that the international community must come 
up with a universal definition of terrorism and a terrorist. I assume that such a 
definition would describe terrorism as a criminal act. Therefore, a terrorist is a 
criminal. By drawing a parallel with the law-enforcement model, even a 
criminal has rights. These rights should be suspended in extraordinary 
situations only and not anytime a state decides it is convenient.  
 
Secondly, the new model must provide a definition for the type of conflict, 
battlefield and parties. This is the point where a new type of conflict has to be 
presented. The type of conflict must encompass a situation that is not yet an 
armed conflict and which is also not a situation of peace. Moreover, the type 
of conflict must cover the conduct of a state that is acting outside its territory. 
The parties to the conflict must be at least a state and a non-state actor. This 
non-state actor may be described as a terrorist organisation. Furthermore, a 
protracted conflict must exist between the terrorist organisation and the 
acting state. An indication of that protracted conflict could be the occurrence 
of terrorist attacks in the past. In addition, the target must be in a remote area 
when considering targeted killing as a preventative measure. The new model 
could also apply to times of an imminent threat.  
 
Thirdly, such a model must require a legal basis for the extraterritorial killing. 
That legal basis must provide strict limitations of immediacy, necessity and 
proportionality on the targeted killing of suspected terrorists.  
 
In this model immediacy requires that here be an imminent threat to the lives 
of potential victims in the targeting state. This threat must be credible, which 
means that the concept of pre-emptive self-defense would not suffice in this 
case. Furthermore, the threat must be so imminent that the stage of attempt 
has already been reached or the next conduct will introduce that stage. The 
exclusion of pre-emptive self-defense can be justified against the backdrop 
that the targeted terrorists are suspects. A suspect is somebody whose 
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culpability is not proven and who may benefit from the presumption of 
innocence.  
 
Targeted killing of suspected terrorists must also meet the requirement of 
necessity. A parallel could be drawn with the necessity test under 
international human rights law at this point. Therefore, this requirement is 
met when there is reasonable and evidential proof of an imminent threat and 
the host state consents to the use of lethal force within its territory. 
Furthermore, any conduct of targeted killing must constitute a contribution to 
the end of “war”. 
 
The requirement of proportionality must also be met. At this point a parallel 
has to be drawn with the law-enforcement model. There must be an 
assessment of the potential victims, the removal of threat and the damage to 
innocent civilian life at the location of the targeted killing.   
 
The establishment of such a model, however, is highly unlikely. A new model 
or convention of law requires states to be willing to become state parties to or 
to apply that model. In the case of targeted killing in particular, states will 
most likely refuse to become party to such a convention and will probably 
prefer to continue to apply the existing unclear models.  
 
However, the reluctance of states in accepting a new legal model is not 
automatically a disadvantage. This legal model derives its validity from the 
need to justify a particular actual scenario. The example of the US 
programme of targeted killings in Yemen and Pakistan illustrates how an 
actual set of circumstances may provide the motivation of a need for a new 
model. In these circumstances the United States may be considered as the 
hegemon – a state that dominates or controls other states or even their 
law.416 This leads to the question: Should any state be in a position of such 
power that it exerts its influence to change the law? Deriving a legal principle 
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from an actual scenario poses high potential risk to the law itself, its 
compliance by such states and a threat to the justice and security.417 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
The targeted killing of suspected terrorists contains two decisive elements 
that form a part of a new condition in international law. First, the 
technological possibility of targeted killing by drones exists. This technology 
makes it possible to send an unmanned drone into a foreign state and carry 
out a targeted kill. Secondly, this new situation is determined by the 
characteristics of a terrorist – someone who does not play by the usual rules 
of war and who is extremely difficult to identify. The international community 
has failed to fill this legal lacuna as still no universal definition of a terrorist or 
terrorism exists.  
 
As presented, each existing model has its difficulties with issue of targeted 
killing of suspected terrorists. By comparing the three existing models, the 
law-enforcement model appears to be the one that is the most capable of at 
the same time protecting both the lives of innocent civilians and the rights of 
suspected terrorists. This derives from its strict limitation on the permissibility 
of targeted killing. The only weak point here is finding application regarding 
the extraterritorial conduct. The other two existing models try to cover the 
issue through concepts such as pre-emptive self-defense, extension of 
geographical scopes or artificial construction of “direct participation”. All 
issues which are highly controversial in any situation.  
 
In examining the programme of targeted killings carried out by the United 
States in Pakistan and Yemen, it becomes apparent that such conduct is 
clearly not lawful under any of the existing models.  
 
Based on the development of transnational terrorism and modern warfare, 
one may argue that there is an actual need for a new model of law. The 
“mixed model” constitutes a step in that direction in so far as it attempts to 
                                            
417 Cf. Jutta Brunee & Stephen J. Toope “Slouching towards new ’just’ wars: The hegemon 
after September 11th“ (2004) 51(3) Netherland International Law Review 363 at 391, 392. 
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combine existing rules for the time of peace and war. However, it fails to 
draw a clear line regarding the application of each model under one model. 
The “mixed model” and the call for new models are a strong indication of the 
need for a universal definition of terrorism so that such a definition can be 
used by existing models of law. The draft of a new model expresses what a 
new model could look like. However, establishing a new model bears the risk 
that states will use it merely to justify a factual situation in order to make it 
lawful. The question is, then, whether international law should follow the 
hegemony by one state that is establishing facts, which may not simply be 
subsumed under existing paradigms. This again leads to the question 
whether one allows that facts establish law, or whether one may apply 
existing law and accept its results. If international law stands for the 
protection of innocent civilians, it must resist these temptations of new 
models and concepts which do not intend to provide that protection. The 
abolition of existing models and application of customised models will not 
serve justice or security. Furthermore, the establishment of new models 
leads to a fragmentation of international law. 
 
The White Paper is a good example of how far principles and model of laws 
are conflated in order to make a particular conduct lawful – essentially 
deriving law from the facts. If we examine the White Paper, it appears that 
the legal basis is not clear. The United States bases its legal justification for 
the targeted killing of its own citizens on the right of self-defense and the law 
of armed conflict. Furthermore, the White Paper uses any model that is 
needed to reach the result of legitimising the targeted killing of suspected 
terrorists, who are US citizens, in a foreign state.418 Another result of this 
conduct by one powerful state is a highly artificial application of the armed 
conflict model, which leads to constructions such as “unlawful combatant”419 
or “active fighter”.420 
 
Any new model would have to be developed with the aim of protecting the 
lives of innocent civilians and the rights of suspected terrorists. Based on that 
                                            
418 White Paper (note 8) 2–5. 
419 See Hamdan case (note 220). 
420 See Bothe (note 301) 9. 
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premise, such a new model may be credible and will not simply appear as 
justifying a particular conduct. I described the standards of such a new model 
in this paper. The model which comes closest to the proposed new model is 
the law-enforcement model. Under this model there are also independent 
organs for review: the human rights courts and committees.421 Without such 
a legal credibility, targeted killing of suspected terrorists risks supporting 
terrorism rather than fighting it. Without a credible test of necessity and 
proportionality, the host state’s population will see civilian casualties as a 
result, which inevitably arouses fear and hatred against the targeting state. 
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